Thursday, 10 September 2026

CA Mahalingam Suresh Kumar (Liquidator) vs. Union Bank of India and Anr.. - The Legislature, in its wisdom, has provided a structured mechanism for determining the Liquidator’s remuneration with the object of ensuring that the liquidation process is completed in a time-bound manner while safeguarding the interests of all stakeholders at every stage. Therefore, any claim for additional remuneration beyond the fee already fixed under Regulation 4 is contrary to the statutory scheme and cannot be sustained.

 NCLT Kochi (2026.07.31) in CA Mahalingam Suresh Kumar (Liquidator) vs. Union Bank of India and Anr.. [(2026) ibclaw.in 2859 NCLT, IA(IBC)/248/KOB/2025 in IBA/240/CB/2019] held that; 

  • The Legislature, in its wisdom, has provided a structured mechanism for determining the Liquidator’s remuneration with the object of ensuring that the liquidation process is completed in a time-bound manner while safeguarding the interests of all stakeholders at every stage. Therefore, any claim for additional remuneration beyond the fee already fixed under Regulation 4 is contrary to the statutory scheme and cannot be sustained.

  • The exclusion of any period for the purpose of computation of the time limit cannot invariably result in the alteration of remuneration unless the relevant governing provisions expressly contemplate such a consequence. In fact, if such a contention is accepted, the entire scheme and objective behind it would collapse.

  • The scheme, as designed, is sufficient to prompt Resolution Professionals/Liquidators to participate in the proceedings and to take diligent steps for the expeditious and timely adjudication of matters by pursuing their interests before the competent courts. If we allow the exclusion of such periods, practically, the Resolution Professionals/Liquidators would cease to show interest in such litigations.

  • The statutory framework is designed to encourage diligence and expedition on the part of the Liquidator while safeguarding the liquidation estate for the benefit of stakeholders. Therefore, on that ground also, the contentions of the Applicant are not acceptable.

  • Though it is correct that no person can be prejudiced by the act of the Court, such a principle certainly cannot be stretched to create a substantive monetary entitlement or be used to grant additional remuneration to the Applicant against the statutory scheme under the IBC. Further, if we allow the relief as claimed, it would unnecessarily burden the liquidation estate and ultimately impact the distributable assets available to the stakeholders, and such interference would be against the settled statutory scheme.


Excerpts of the Order

# 1. The present application has been filed by the applicant under Section 60(5) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, read with Rule 11 of the NCLT Rules, 2016, seeking the following reliefs:-

  • a. To fix the fee payable to the Liquidator for the exceptional period of prolonged litigation and stay [35.5 months], and this payment be made on par with the minimum statutory fees payable to the Resolution Professional;

  • b. To pass Such other orders or further orders which may deemed to be fit and proper in the interest of justice.


Brief facts of the case:

# 2. The present Application has been filed by the Liquidator seeking remuneration for duties performed during the 35.5-month stay period in the liquidation process. CIRP was initiated by Union Bank of India under Section 7 of the IBC and admitted by the NCLT, Chennai Bench on 20.03.2019. Mr. Shanmugam Rajendran was appointed as IRP and later confirmed as RP. Liquidation was ordered on 16.12.2019, and the Applicant was appointed as Liquidator on 07.02.2020.


# 3. It is submitted that an e-auction notice dated 29.02.2020 for the sale of the Corporate Debtor as a going concern could not proceed due to the Covid-19 lockdown. Subsequently, this Adjudicating Authority permitted the use of the hospital premises for COVID-19 treatment and quarantine facilities. Thereafter, multiple litigations, writ petitions, appeals, and SLPs before the Hon’ble High Court of Kerala, Hon’ble NCLAT, and Hon’ble Supreme Court resulted in repeated stay orders and delay of the liquidation process. The extended liquidation period expired on 12.09.2025.


# 4. Further, it is submitted that despite continuous litigation and interruption of e-auctions, the Applicant continued to perform duties under the Code, including maintenance and revival of the only multispecialty hospital in Erattupetta during Covid-19, resulting in value maximisation and successful sale of all assets except the Doctor’s Quarters. In the 6th e-auction, EMD was received but refunded due to stay orders. The SCC later approved the 12th e-auction of the Doctor’s Quarters at a reserve price of Rs. 3,41,00,000/-.


# 5. The Applicant submitted that more than 50 man-months were spent handling litigations, protecting assets, and operating the hospital during the stay period, without remuneration. The request for payment of minimum RP fees for the stay period was placed before the SCC in the 11th and 16th meetings, where Union Bank of India and MEUCB advised approaching this Adjudicating Authority. Relying on Regulation 4(2)(a) of the IBBI Liquidation Regulations and orders of the NCLT Mumbai and Chandigarh Benches, the Applicant seeks payment of Liquidator’s fees for the 35.5-month stay period on par with RP fees, as the delays were caused entirely by litigations and stay orders beyond the Applicant’s control.


Reply of Respondent No. 1:-

# 6. It is submitted that the Applicant/Liquidator has received all fees legally due and payable under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, and the applicable Regulations. The manner and method of payment of Liquidator’s fees are governed by Regulation 4 of the IBBI (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016.


# 7. It is submitted that under Regulation 4 of the IBBI (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016, the Liquidator’s fee is payable only as per the agreed mode, which in this case was a percentage of assets realized and distributed. The same has already been paid in full. The Applicant had initially sought a fee under Regulation 4 vide communication dated 23.12.2019 to Union Bank of India, but later agreed to a revised fee structure. Assets worth Rs. 39.72 crores were realised, and the liquidator’s fee of Rs. 55,21,497/- has already been paid, in addition to liquidation costs borne by stakeholders. Hence, the claim for additional fee is not maintainable.


# 8. It is further submitted that the fee was not fixed on a monthly basis, but only on realisation; therefore, the delay or stay period cannot justify any additional remuneration. In Union Bank of India vs. Mindlogicx Infratec Ltd., the NCLT held that no fees are payable for the period of stay. Further, the respondent quotes the decision of the Hon’ble NCLAT in Rajputana Constructions Pvt. Ltd. v. Rajasthan Land Holdings Ltd. and Ors. The decisions relied upon by the Applicant are not applicable to the present facts. It is submitted that the Liquidator’s claim of value enhancement during COVID-19 is unsubstantiated. The inclusion of guarantor assets for value maximisation was possible due to the cooperation of Union Bank of India, and the Liquidator has already been compensated for the same. The Liquidator cannot claim additional fees based on asset maximisation or stay period, as he has already been fully paid in accordance with the Code and Regulations.


Reply of Respondent No. 2:-

# 9. It is submitted by Respondent No. 2 that the present Application filed by the Liquidator is misconceived and not maintainable. Though the Liquidator was appointed in 2020 and an e-auction notice was issued, the sale proceedings were suspended due to COVID-19. Thereafter, this Adjudicating Authority permitted the hospital premises to be used for COVID treatment and quarantine facilities, and subsequently, the matter was stayed by the Hon’ble High Court of Kerala and later by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Hence, no liquidation activity was carried out during the COVID period and the period of stay. Therefore, claiming the liquidator’s fee for such period is unreasonable and illegal.


# 10. Further, IA(IBC)/1/KOB/2025 has already been filed seeking adjudication of liquidation expenses and the liquidator’s fee. Annexure A3 shows that the Liquidator calculated the sale value contrary to the original sale price and split the value under different heads for unjust enrichment. The Liquidator claimed Rs. 4,25,00,000/- as liquidation expenses and Rs. 49,40,731/- separately as liquidator’s fee without proper explanation or approval. As per Regulation 2(1)(ea) of the IBBI (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016, liquidation cost includes the liquidator’s fee. Hence, charging both separately is contrary to the law and amounts to unjust enrichment at the expense of the creditors.


Findings:-

# 11. We have heard the matter and perused the material available on record. This is an application filed by the liquidator under Section 60(5) read with Rule 11 of NCLT Rules, 2016, for additional remuneration and the prayer so made in IA is reproduced as under at the cost of repetition:

  • a. To fix the fee payable to the Liquidator for the exceptional period of prolonged litigation and stay [35.5 months], and this payment be made on par with the minimum statutory fees payable to the Resolution Professional;

  • b. To pass Such other orders or further orders which may deemed to be fit and proper in the interest of justice.


# 12. But during the course of the arguments, the Applicant, in a conscious manner, tried to increase and extend its prayer by seeking an alternate relief to exclude the period of 35.5 months from various time periods from 15.03.2020 to 10.06.2024 while computing the remuneration from the Liquidation Commencement Date. The matter requires consideration, as the Applicant has raised serious concerns to invoke the sympathy of this Adjudicating Authority on the equity side in the absence of any specific statutory provision.


# 13. In this matter, the CIRP against the Corporate Debtor was initiated on 20.03.2019, and subsequently, this Adjudicating Authority rejected the resolution plan and passed a liquidation order on 16.12.2019. The Applicant was appointed as the Liquidator on 07.02.2020 upon confirmation by the IBBI. The Liquidator issued a public announcement in Form B on 12.02.2020 and filed the Asset Memorandum and Preliminary Report on 24.02.2020. The Liquidator initiated the sale process and issued an e-auction notice on 29.02.2020 for the sale of the Corporate Debtor as a going concern. This process was interrupted due to the nationwide COVID-19 lockdown, and the Corporate Debtor’s hospital was taken over by the District Administration. The Applicant referred to various litigations filed before the Hon’ble High Court of Kerala, the Hon’ble NCLAT, and the Hon’ble Supreme Court, and it is also stated that the Hon’ble Supreme Court, vide order dated 09.12.2022, stayed the auction proceedings; vide order dated 07.08.2023, set aside the orders of the Hon’ble NCLAT; and ultimately, vide order dated 09.07.2024, the Hon’ble NCLAT dismissed the Company Appeal, immediately thereafter, the Liquidator proceeded with the sale process.


# 14. The Liquidator filed a caveat before the Hon’ble Supreme Court on 11.07.2024, and on 12.07.2024, the Hon’ble High Court disposed of the writ petition as infructuous. In short, citing all such litigations, the Applicant submitted that, due to such litigations and interim protections, he could not proceed for a period of 35.5 months, and once the Hon’ble Higher Courts disposed of those matters, he promptly resumed the liquidation process and auctioned the properties. It is the case of the Applicant that the Liquidator cannot be penalised for the delay caused by the litigations and submitted that he is entitled to Rs. 1 lakh per month for a period of 35.5 months or, in the alternative, to the exclusion of the litigation period for the computation of the fee.


# 15. Before proceeding further, it would be appropriate to record that, in this matter, the total assets have been sold for Rs. 39.72 crore, for which a liquidation fee of Rs. 55,21,497/- has already been paid to the Applicant. Apart from this, the liquidation cost and the actual expenses incurred by the Liquidator in defending various litigations by engaging advocates, along with other incidental charges and expenses, have been paid separately by the stakeholders. It would be worth mentioning that the Liquidator is entitled to its fee in terms of Regulation 4 of the IBBI (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016 (“Liquidation Process Regulations”), which reads as under:

  • “(1) The fee payable to the liquidator shall be in accordance with the decision taken by the committee of creditors under regulation 39D of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016.
    (1A) Where no fee has been fixed under sub-regulation (1), the consultation committee may fix the fee of the liquidator in its first meeting.

  • (2) In cases other than those covered under sub-regulation (1) and (1A), the liquidator shall be entitled to a fee-

  • (a) at the same rate as the resolution professional was entitled to during the corporate insolvency resolution process, for the period of compromise or arrangement under section 230 of the Companies Act, 2013 (18 of 2013); and

  • (b) as a percentage of the amount realised net of other liquidation costs, and of the amount distributed, for the balance period of liquidation, as under:

  • Clarification: For the purposes of clause (b), it is hereby clarified that where a liquidator realises any amount, but does not distribute the same, he shall be entitled to a fee corresponding to the amount realised by him. Where a liquidator distributes any amount, which is not realised by him, he shall be entitled to a fee corresponding to the amount distributed by him.

  • (3) Where the fee is payable under clause (b) of sub-regulation (2), the liquidator shall be entitled to receive half of the fee payable on realisation only after such realised amount is distributed. Clarification: Regulation 4 of these regulations, as it stood before the commencement of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Liquidation Process) (Amendment) Regulations, 2019 shall continue to be applicable in relation to the liquidation processes already commenced before the coming into force of the said amendment Regulations.”


# 16. The Liquidator is entitled to a fee in terms of the conditions stipulated in the relevant provisions and, in the present case, the fee has been agreed to be paid as per the percentage of assets realised and distributed under Regulation 4(2)(b) of the Liquidation Process Regulations. There is no dispute that the Liquidator has already received its remuneration and fee in terms of the said provisions. It is argued on behalf of Respondent No. 1 that the Liquidator issued a communication dated 23.12.2019 to Union Bank of India requesting that his fee be paid as per Regulation 4 of the Liquidation Process Regulations, 2016, and thereafter, upon negotiations, the Liquidator agreed to a revised amount. Therefore, the Applicant cannot renege on such arrangement. Both parties have submitted various judgments in support of their respective pleadings.


# 17. The Applicant has placed reliance on the decisions of the NCLT, Mumbai Bench in M/s. Shri Karvir Nivasini Mahalaxmi Ispat Pvt. Ltd. v. M/s. Abhishek Corporation Limited; the Hon’ble NCLAT in Bank of India v. Nithin Grains and Mills Private Limited, and the NCLT, Chandigarh Bench in Sanjay Kumar Aggarwal, Liquidator of M/s. Punjab Basmati Rice Ltd. (Under Liquidation) v. Canara Bank and Another, in support of the contention that the period excluded from liquidation on account of judicial orders ought to be excluded for the purpose of computation of the Liquidator’s fee or that the Liquidator should be granted remuneration for such excluded period. We have carefully considered the ratio laid down in the aforesaid decisions. However, on a careful examination of the factual matrix and the reliefs granted therein, we find that the same do not govern the controversy involved in the present application.


# 18. In M/s. Shri Karvir Nivasini Mahalaxmi Ispat Pvt. Ltd. (supra), the Adjudicating Authority was dealing with a liquidation process commenced prior to the amendment of the Liquidation Process Regulations, where no fee had been approved by the Committee of Creditors, and the Adjudicating Authority directed computation of the Liquidator’s remuneration after taking into account the periods specifically excluded by judicial orders, while also granting remuneration in view of the peculiar facts where the Corporate Debtor continued to be managed by the Liquidator during the excluded period. Likewise, in Bank of India v. Nithin Grains and Mills Private Limited (supra), the issue before the Hon’ble NCLAT was confined to the reasonableness of remuneration payable to an erstwhile Liquidator up to the date of handing over charge to the newly appointed Liquidator, and the Appellate Tribunal merely directed the Stakeholders’ Consultation Committee to consider and approve the remuneration claimed. Similarly, in Sanjay Kumar Aggarwal, Liquidator of M/s. Punjab Basmati Rice Ltd. (supra), the Adjudicating Authority was considering the effect of earlier judicial orders expressly excluding certain periods from the liquidation timeline and, relying upon the specific facts of that case and earlier precedents, directed exclusion of such periods for the limited purpose of computation of the fee slab under the applicable Regulations.


# 19. The factual and legal position in the present case stands on an entirely different footing. Here, the remuneration payable to the Applicant had already been settled and accepted in terms of Regulation 4 of the IBBI (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016, based on the percentage of assets realised and distributed, and the Applicant has admittedly received the entire fee payable under the agreed statutory mechanism. The present application does not arise out of any dispute regarding fixation or computation of the fee under the applicable Regulations, nor is there any prior judicial direction excluding the litigation period for the purpose of recalculating the fee. Rather, the Applicant seeks creation of an independent entitlement to additional remuneration for the period during which the liquidation proceedings remained affected by judicial proceedings and interim orders. None of the authorities relied upon by the Applicant lays down any proposition that a Liquidator, after having received the remuneration payable under the statutory framework, is entitled to claim additional monthly remuneration merely because the liquidation process remained pending on account of litigation or judicial stay. Accordingly, the aforesaid decisions are clearly distinguishable on facts as well as on the legal issues involved and do not advance the case of the Applicant.


# 20. The Respondents have, on the other hand, placed reliance upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Glas Trust Company LLC v. BYJU Raveendran & Ors., the decisions of the NCLT, Guwahati Bench and the Hon’ble NCLAT in Kannan Tiruvengadam v. Assets Care & Reconstruction Enterprise Limited & Ors., the decision of the NCLT in Kantipudi Venkata Raju, Liquidator of Kaanha Shipping (P.) Ltd. v. Board of Visakhapatnam Port Authority, as well as the decisions in Union Bank of India v. Mindlogicx Infratec Ltd., Rajputana Constructions Pvt. Ltd. v. Rajasthan Land Holdings Ltd. & Ors., and IndusInd Bank Ltd. v. Rajendra K. Bhuta. We have carefully examined the aforesaid decisions. While the principles enunciated therein are well settled, we are of the considered view that the said decisions also do not conclusively govern the issue involved in the present application and are distinguishable on their own facts and the issues decided therein.


# 21. The decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Glas Trust Company LLC v. BYJU Raveendran & Ors. reiterates the settled principle that where a statute prescribes a particular procedure, the same must ordinarily be followed and the inherent powers of the Tribunal cannot be invoked to create a remedy inconsistent with the statutory framework. The said proposition is unexceptionable and has been duly kept in view while adjudicating the present application. However, the said judgment did not concern the determination of a Liquidator’s remuneration under Regulation 4 of the IBBI (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016, nor did it deal with the consequences of prolonged judicial intervention during liquidation proceedings. Similarly, the decisions in Kannan Tiruvengadam and Kantipudi Venkata Raju were rendered in the context of cases where the Committee of Creditors and the Stakeholders’ Consultation Committee had not fixed the Liquidator’s remuneration, and the Tribunals held that, in such circumstances, the Liquidator would be entitled only to the statutory fee contemplated under Regulation 4(2)(b). Those decisions were concerned with the mode of determination of the Liquidator’s fee in the absence of any prior fixation and not with a claim for additional remuneration after the statutory fee had already been determined and paid.


# 22. Likewise, the reliance placed on Union Bank of India v. Mindlogicx Infratec Ltd., Rajputana Constructions Pvt. Ltd. v. Rajasthan Land Holdings Ltd. & Ors., and IndusInd Bank Ltd. v. Rajendra K. Bhuta is also distinct. The issues arising in those cases pertained to the entitlement of an Interim Resolution Professional or Resolution Professional to claim fees during periods when the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process itself remained stayed or was subsequently set aside. The said decisions were rendered in the context of the statutory framework governing the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process and not the liquidation process. The nature of duties, the statutory responsibilities, and the mechanism for payment of remuneration during CIRP are materially different from those governing liquidation under the Code.


# 23. Thus, although both the Applicant and the Respondents have relied upon various judicial precedents, this Adjudicating Authority is of the considered opinion that none of the case laws cited by either side directly addresses the issue arising in the present application, namely, whether a Liquidator, who has admittedly received the remuneration payable in accordance with Regulation 4 of the IBBI (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016, can thereafter claim an independent or additional remuneration solely on account of the liquidation proceedings having remained pending due to judicial proceedings and interim orders.


# 24. Having considered the rival contentions and upon thoughtful consideration of the issues involved, it is noticed that the Applicant, in the present application, has sought additional remuneration payable to the Liquidator for the period the liquidation process remained affected on account of prolonged litigation and judicial stay, at a rate equivalent to the minimum statutory fee payable to a Resolution Professional. Such a claim, however, finds no recognition under the statutory scheme of the IBC. This Adjudicating Authority is of the considered view that the remuneration of the Liquidator is not governed by equitable considerations alone but is governed by the statutory framework under the IBC, 2016, and the regulations framed thereunder. The delay in proceeding with the liquidation process on account of ongoing litigations and interim protection, if any, or extraordinary circumstances that arose due to the COVID-19 pandemic cannot, by itself, be attributed to any omission or negligence on the part of the Liquidator, but simultaneously, such circumstances do not automatically confer a legal right to claim enhancement of remuneration beyond the statutory scheme.


# 25. It is also relevant to note that, in the present case, the remuneration of the Liquidator was fixed by the Stakeholders’ Consultation Committee (SCC), at the request of the Liquidator himself, as part of the liquidation cost in terms of Regulation 4 of the IBBI (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016, and the Applicant has already received the fee so determined. Once the remuneration has been fixed and accepted under the statutory framework, the Liquidator is estopped from claiming any additional fee outside the framework of Regulation 4. The Legislature, in its wisdom, has provided a structured mechanism for determining the Liquidator’s remuneration with the object of ensuring that the liquidation process is completed in a time-bound manner while safeguarding the interests of all stakeholders at every stage. Therefore, any claim for additional remuneration beyond the fee already fixed under Regulation 4 is contrary to the statutory scheme and cannot be sustained.


# 26. The exclusion of any period for the purpose of computation of the time limit cannot invariably result in the alteration of remuneration unless the relevant governing provisions expressly contemplate such a consequence. In fact, if such a contention is accepted, the entire scheme and objective behind it would collapse. The scheme, as designed, is sufficient to prompt Resolution Professionals/Liquidators to participate in the proceedings and to take diligent steps for the expeditious and timely adjudication of matters by pursuing their interests before the competent courts. If we allow the exclusion of such periods, practically, the Resolution Professionals/Liquidators would cease to show interest in such litigations. In other words, such an interpretation would dilute the incentive for expeditious completion of the liquidation process and could discourage timely pursuit and disposal of pending proceedings affecting liquidation. The statutory framework is designed to encourage diligence and expedition on the part of the Liquidator while safeguarding the liquidation estate for the benefit of stakeholders. Therefore, on that ground also, the contentions of the Applicant are not acceptable.


# 27. Further, acceptance of such propositions would, in fact, amount to judicial interference with and modification of the statutory mechanism regulating the Liquidator’s fee. Such judicial intervention is impermissible in the absence of enabling provisions. Though it is correct that no person can be prejudiced by the act of the Court, such a principle certainly cannot be stretched to create a substantive monetary entitlement or be used to grant additional remuneration to the Applicant against the statutory scheme under the IBC. Further, if we allow the relief as claimed, it would unnecessarily burden the liquidation estate and ultimately impact the distributable assets available to the stakeholders, and such interference would be against the settled statutory scheme. As such, we find no merit in granting any such reliefs allegedly claimed by the Applicant in this application. The Applicant has already received Rs. 55,21,497/- in addition to the actual costs and other expenses, including legal fees paid by him in defending the litigations. Therefore, we find no merit in rewriting the statutory provisions at the instance of the Applicant.


# 28. In view of the above, IA(IBC)/248/KOB/2025 in IBA/240/CB/2019 stands dismissed.


# 29. The Registry is directed to send e-mail copies of this order forthwith to all the parties and their Ld. Counsel for information and for taking necessary steps.


# 30. A Certified Copy of this Order may be issued, if applied for, upon compliance with all requisite formalities.

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Thursday, 27 August 2026

Gondwana Engineers Ltd. vs Bijay Murmuria (Liquidator) and Ors.- Section 48 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 applies in its ordinary terms: successive rights created over the same immovable property rank in the order of their creation, and each later-created right is, absent special contract, subject to rights previously created.

 NCLAT (2026.08.21) in  Gondwana Engineers Ltd.  vs  Bijay Murmuria (Liquidator) and Ors. [(2026) ibclaw.in 998 NCLAT: Comp. App. (AT) (Ins) No. 1276 of 2026] held that;

  • Section 60(5)(c) of the Code confers upon the Adjudicating Authority jurisdiction to entertain “any question of priorities or any question of law or facts, arising out of or in relation to the insolvency resolution or liquidation proceedings of the corporate debtor.

  • The deliberate use of the word “priorities” forecloses the very contention now advanced: a dispute as to the inter se priority of charges over an asset of the Corporate Debtor, arising in the course of its liquidation, is a paradigm instance of the jurisdiction the provision was designed to confer, not a matter excluded from it.

  • When a prior encumbrance is discharged, a subsisting subsequent encumbrance moves up in priority, there being no fresh, intervening right of a stranger created in between.

  • Section 48 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 applies in its ordinary terms: successive rights created over the same immovable property rank in the order of their creation, and each later-created right is, absent special contract, subject to rights previously created.

  • The principle that an assignee steps into the shoes of, and can claim no greater right then, the assignor is precisely what the Adjudicating Authority applied at paragraphs holding that Areion Finserve and, in turn, Raj Radhe Finance, could acquire no more than the subordinate charge that BOM itself held.

  • It is not, however, the mode of creation of the charge; the charge here was created by the underlying contract, the equitable mortgage effected through the NOC dated 10.09.2012 and the Memorandum dated 16.01.2013 and continues to bind the immediate parties to that transaction and those claiming through them with notice of it, regardless of registration.

  • An order is not per incuriam merely because it does not advert, in terms, to a statutory provision that, on a correct application of law as discussed above, would not in any event have altered the outcome.

  • It is well settled that mere pendency of a review, revision or appeal does not, without an order of stay, suspend the operation or binding effect of the order under challenge; the order continues to bind the parties until set aside or stayed.


Excerpts of the Order

Findings

# 49. At the outset, we note that the core controversy concerns the inter se priority of competing charges over an immovable property i.e. the Sigma-9 Property , owned by the Corporate Debtor, as between (a) a second pari-passu equitable mortgage created in 2012–13 in favour of IDBI Bank Limited (“Respondent No. 3”) and Dena Bank, now Bank of Baroda (“Respondent No. 4”/“BOB”), and (b) a Simple Mortgage Deed dated 20.03.2015 executed by the Corporate Debtor as guarantor-mortgagor in favour of Bank of Maharashtra (“Respondent No. 5”/“BOM”) to secure independent credit facilities extended by BOM to the Appellant a security interest subsequently assigned by BOM, first to Areion Finserve Private Limited (“Respondent No. 2”) and thereafter to Raj Radhe Finance Limited (“Respondent No. 8”). The Adjudicating Authority has held that the Sigma-9 Property forms part of the liquidation estate of the Corporate Debtor, and that the mortgage traceable to BOM ranks subordinate to the charge of IDBI Bank and BOB. Aggrieved thereby, the Appellant has preferred the present appeal.


# 50. The facts, as borne out from the paper-book and the impugned order (including the chronology recorded by the Adjudicating Authority at paragraph 31.4 thereof), may be briefly noticed as under:

Date

Event

30.12.2009

Doshion Private Limited (“the Corporate Debtor”) purchased House No. 9, Sigma Corporate, behind Rajpath Club, Bodakdev, Ahmedabad (“the Sigma-9 Property”).

07.01.2010

Bank of Maharashtra (“BOM”) sanctioned a Loan Against Property facility of Rs. 3.20 crore to the Corporate Debtor and obtained an equitable mortgage over the Sigma-9 Property, thereby becoming its first charge-holder.

10.09.2012

BOM issued a No Objection Certificate permitting creation of a second pari-passu charge over the Sigma-9 Property in favour of IDBI Bank Limited and Dena Bank (now Bank of Baroda, “BOB”), who had separately sanctioned facilities aggregating approximately Rs. 140 crore to the Corporate Debtor.

16.01.2013

A Memorandum recording extension of equitable mortgage was executed, whereby IDBI Bank and Dena Bank acquired a second pari-passu charge over the Sigma-9 Property, subordinate to the first charge of BOM.

20.08.2014 &12.09.2014

IDBI Bank and Dena Bank respectively restructured their credit facilities (to Rs. 93.48 crore and Rs. 87.77 crore), continuing to record the Sigma-9 Property as collateral security.

11.03.2015

A Joint Lenders’ Meeting was held between BOM and the IDBI-Dena Bank consortium concerning extension of the second charge.

20.03.2015

BOM issued a No Due Certificate closing the Corporate Debtor’s 2010 Loan Against Property account; on the very same day, Gondwana Engineers Limited (“the Appellant”) executed a fresh, independent Simple Mortgage Deed in favour of BOM over the Sigma-9 Property, securing the Appellant’s own separate credit facilities, with the Corporate Debtor furnishing the property as guarantor-mortgagor.

06.04.2015

BOM, Pune Branch informed BOM, Ahmedabad Branch that no second charge on the Sigma-9 Property was to be ceded without approval of the competent authority.

08.05.2017

Bank of Baroda instituted O.A. No. 282 of 2017 before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Ahmedabad (“DRT”).

17.10.2018

The DRT, in S.A. No. 154/2017, upheld Bank of Baroda’s symbolic possession under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, recording that a second charge in its favour over the Sigma-9 Property was not in dispute.

08.11.2019

The DRT, Ahmedabad, in O.A. No. 282 of 2017, held that IDBI Bank and Dena Bank (BOB) became first charge-holders over the Sigma-9 Property upon discharge of BOM’s facility, and that any subsequent loan by BOM would rank subordinate thereto.

2020

The Appellant filed Review Application No. 1 of 2020 against the DRT order dated 08.11.2019; no order staying that order has been placed on record at any stage.

31.08.2021

The Corporate Debtor was admitted into CIRP in C.P.(IB) No. 59 of 2019.

03.10.2023

The Corporate Debtor was ordered to be liquidated; Mr. Bijay Murmuria, Authorised Insolvency Professional of Sumedha Management Solutions Private Limited, was appointed Liquidator (“the Liquidator”/“Respondent No. 1”). Public announcement under Regulation 12 followed on 11.10.2023, fixing 08.11.2023 as the last date for submission of claims and 08.12.2023 for verification.

27.10.2023( regd. 30.11.2023)

BOM executed an Assignment Agreement in favour of Areion Finserve Private Limited (“Respondent No. 2”), assigning its debt and security interest, including over the Sigma-9 Property. No claim was lodged by BOM in the liquidation, and no intimation under Section 52 read with Regulation 21A(1) was given by BOM or Areion Finserve within thirty days of the liquidation commencement date.

21.06.2024

The Adjudicating Authority, in I.A. Nos. 63 of 2022 and 94 of 2022, directed handing over of possession of the Corporate Debtor’s properties to the Liquidator.

06.07.2024

Areion Finserve filed Form-D before the Liquidator asserting rights over the Sigma-9 Property — nearly nine months after the liquidation commencement date and well beyond the prescribed timeline.

15.07.2024 –07.09.2024

The Liquidator rejected Areion Finserve’s claim for delay and non-compliance with Regulation 21A; reconsideration was sought and reiteratively declined.

24.01.2025 –08.07.2025

Areion Finserve’s I.A. Nos. 231 and 341 of 2025 (condonation of delay; challenge to rejection) were, after being filed, ultimately dismissed for non-prosecution on 08.07.2025; no order setting aside or staying that dismissal is on record.

12.03.2025

The Liquidator filed (amended) I.A. No. 440(AHM)2025 under Section 60(5) of the Code seeking declarations concerning the Sigma-9 Property and the assignment deeds.

02.05.2025

Areion Finserve assigned its rights to Raj Radhe Finance Limited (“Respondent No. 8”).

22.09.2025

Raj Radhe Finance Limited filed I.A. No. 1137(AHM)2025 under Section 42 read with Section 60(5)(c) of the Code, challenging rejection of the claim originally filed by Areion Finserve.

01.04.2026

The Liquidator filed I.A. No. 525(AHM)2026 seeking amendment of I.A. No. 440 of 2025 for a consequential direction for handover of the original title deeds of the Sigma-9 Property.

30.06.2026

The Adjudicating Authority passed the impugned Common Order disposing of I.A. Nos. 440(AHM)2025, 1137(AHM)2025 and 525(AHM)2026.

17.06.2026

The Liquidator issued a notice (with corrigendum) for auction of the Corporate Debtor’s properties, including the Sigma-9 Property, fixed for 20.07.2026.

16.07.2026

The present appeal, together with applications for ad-interim stay of the impugned order and of the proposed auction, came to be filed.


# 51. The Adjudicating Authority framed four issues for determination, namely: 

  • (i) whether IDBI Bank and BOB acquired first charge over the Sigma-9 Property upon discharge of BOM’s earlier dues, and the nature and effect of the mortgage subsequently created by the Appellant in favour of BOM; 

  • (ii) whether the assignment of debt by BOM to Areion Finserve, and thereafter to Raj Radhe Finance, conferred any rights on the assignees and required adjudication of the validity of those assignments; 

  • (iii) whether BOM and its assignees failed to exercise the option to realise their security interest within the period prescribed under Section 52 of the Code read with Regulation 21A of the IBBI (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016, and whether rejection of Areion Finserve’s claim warranted interference under Section 42 of the Code; and 

  • (iv) whether the Sigma-9 Property forms part of the liquidation estate and the Liquidator is entitled to its custody and control, including the original title deeds. 


On Issue (i), the Adjudicating Authority held that upon BOM’s No Due Certificate dated 20.03.2015 discharging its 2010 facility, the second pari-passu charge already vested in IDBI Bank and BOB with effect from 16.01.2013 automatically assumed the position of first charge, and that the Simple Mortgage Deed dated 20.03.2015 in favour of BOM, though validly created, ranked subordinate thereto. 


On Issue (ii), it declined to adjudicate upon or invalidate the assignment deeds, holding that the assignees merely stepped into the shoes of BOM and could acquire no greater right. 


On Issue (iii), it held that BOM and its assignees failed to intimate their election to realise security outside liquidation within thirty days as required by Regulation 21A(1), that the claim filed by Areion Finserve on 06.07.2024 was hopelessly delayed, and that rejection of that claim called for no interference under Section 42. 


On Issue (iv), it held that the Sigma-9 Property forms part of the liquidation estate under Section 36 of the Code and that the Liquidator is entitled to custody and control thereof, including the original title deeds, under Section 35.


# 52. In consequence, the Adjudicating Authority 

  • (a) partly allowed I.A. No. 440(AHM)2025, declaring the Sigma-9 Property to be part of the liquidation estate and holding that the security interest of Respondent Nos. 2 and 8 (Areion Finserve and Raj Radhe Finance), being subordinate and having lapsed into the liquidation estate under Regulation 21A(3), would not obstruct the Liquidator, while declining to quash the assignment deeds themselves; 

  • (b) dismissed I.A. No. 1137(AHM)2025 filed by Raj Radhe Finance Limited; and 

  • (c) allowed I.A. No. 525(AHM)2026, directing BOM, Areion Finserve, Raj Radhe Finance, or any person in possession of the original title deeds of the Sigma-9 Property to hand them over to the Liquidator within two weeks, failing which coercive steps under Sections 35(1)(n) and 70 of the Code were left open.


# 53. Having heard the matter and perused the paper-book, including the impugned order in its entirety, the said grounds resolve themselves into the following six Issues, which alone require determination and are dealt with issue-wise below:

  • ISSUE NO. (1) Whether I.A. No. 440(AHM)2025 involved adjudication of matters beyond the jurisdiction of the Adjudicating Authority under Section 60(5) of the Code.

  • ISSUE NO. (2) Whether the Adjudicating Authority erred in holding that the second pari-passu charge of IDBI Bank and BOB ranks in priority over the Simple Mortgage Deed dated 20.03.2015 in favour of BOM

  • ISSUE NO. (3) Whether the absence of registration of the IDBI Bank/BOB charge with the Registrar of Companies (“ROC”)/CERSAI, and the alleged non-consideration of Sections 77 and 79 of the Companies Act, 2013, renders the impugned order perverse or per incuriam.

  • ISSUE NO. (4) Whether the pendency of Review Application No. 1 of 2020 against the DRT order dated 08.11.2019 detracts from the impugned order.

  • ISSUE NO. (5) Whether the impugned order suffers from internal inconsistency in simultaneously including the Sigma-9 Property in the liquidation estate and declining to set aside the assignment deeds dated 27.10.2023 and dated 02.05.2025.

  • ISSUE NO. (6) Whether the dismissal of I.A. No. 1137(AHM)2025 and the directions in I.A. No. 525(AHM)2026 call for interference by this Appellate Tribunal.


Issue wise discussion

ISSUE NO.(1) Whether I.A. No. 440(AHM)2025 involved adjudication of matters beyond the jurisdiction of the Adjudicating Authority under Section 60(5) of the Code.

# 54. The Appellant urged that I.A. No. 440(AHM)2025 was, in essence, an attempt to obtain declarations regarding proprietary rights, mortgage priority and inter se rights of secured creditors — matters said to be governed by the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and general mortgage law, and therefore not amenable to the summary jurisdiction conferred by Section 60(5) of the Code.


# 55. This contention does not survive a plain reading of the statute. Section 60(5)(c) of the Code confers upon the Adjudicating Authority jurisdiction to entertain “any question of priorities or any question of law or facts, arising out of or in relation to the insolvency resolution or liquidation proceedings of the corporate debtor.” The deliberate use of the word “priorities” forecloses the very contention now advanced: a dispute as to the inter se priority of charges over an asset of the Corporate Debtor, arising in the course of its liquidation, is a paradigm instance of the jurisdiction the provision was designed to confer, not a matter excluded from it.


# 56. Nor can the determination be characterised as collateral to liquidation. Unless the Adjudicating Authority determines whether, and subject to what encumbrance, the Sigma-9 Property forms part of the liquidation estate, the Liquidator cannot discharge the statutory duties cast upon him under Sections 35 and 36 of the Code to take custody, verify and realise the assets of the estate. The question “does this asset belong to the estate, and free of what claims” is not incidental to liquidation; it is foundational to it.


# 57. We also take into consideration that the Appellant’s own reply dated 18.07.2025 before the Adjudicating Authority (recorded at paragraphs 8.1 to 8.13 of the impugned order) did not question the Adjudicating Authority’s jurisdiction to decide priority at all; on the contrary, it squarely invited a decision on merits that the charge of IDBI Bank and BOB was never perfected for want of registration and could not prevail over the mortgage traceable to BOM. Having invited an adjudication on the very question of priority and having failed on merits, it is not open to the Appellant to contend for the first time before this Appellate Tribunal that the forum it invoked lacked jurisdiction to decide what it was asked to decide.


# 58. On the issue that the Adjudicating Authority travelled beyond the pleadings, we note that the reliefs sought in I.A. No. 440(AHM)2025 (extracted at paragraph 2 of the impugned order) expressly sought declarations as to the character of the Sigma-9 Property and the legality of the charges created by the assignment deeds qua that property. Determination of the underlying priority of mortgages was a necessary and inseverable incident of granting or refusing those very declarations; it cannot be said that relief was granted beyond the prayers. Issue No. 1 is accordingly answered against the Appellant.


Issue No. (2) Whether the Adjudicating Authority erred in holding that the second pari-passu charge of IDBI Bank and BOB ranks in priority over the Simple Mortgage Deed dated 20.03.2015 in favour of BOM?

# 59. The undisputed sequence is this: BOM acquired a first equitable mortgage on 07.01.2010; IDBI Bank and Dena Bank (BOB) acquired a second pari-passu charge with effect from 16.01.2013, pursuant to BOM’s own No Objection Certificate dated 10.09.2012; and on 20.03.2015, BOM discharged the very facility that constituted its first charge (by issuing a No Due Certificate) while, on the same day, the Appellant executed an entirely fresh and independent Simple Mortgage Deed over the same property in favour of BOM, securing the Appellant’s own, unrelated credit facilities, with the Corporate Debtor furnishing the property merely as guarantor-mortgagor.


# 60. On this sequence, the finding that the second pari-passu charge of IDBI Bank and BOB automatically assumed the position of first charge upon discharge of BOM’s 2010 facility is unexceptionable and follows from elementary mortgage law: when a prior encumbrance is discharged, a subsisting subsequent encumbrance moves up in priority, there being no fresh, intervening right of a stranger created in between. The 2015 Simple Mortgage Deed, on the correct finding of the Adjudicating Authority, was not a renewal or continuation of the discharged 2010 mortgage but a new and independent transaction securing a different borrower (the Appellant) and different facilities; neither the sanction letter nor the mortgage deed reserved to BOM a continuation of its erstwhile firs-tranking priority notwithstanding the intervening, already-vested rights of IDBI Bank and BOB.


# 61. In the absence of such a stipulation, Section 48 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 applies in its ordinary terms: successive rights created over the same immovable property rank in the order of their creation, and each later-created right is, absent special contract, subject to rights previously created. We are of considered view that this priority of a first-created charge under Section 48 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is not displaced by provisions of company law governing distribution among secured creditors, and continues to bind unless the earlier charge-holder has itself relinquished its security.


# 62. The “composite transaction” argument of the Appellant is that discharge of the 2010 facility and creation of the 2015 mortgage formed one indivisible restructuring, such that BOM’s priority ought to be treated as unbroken, does not withstand scrutiny of the parties and facilities involved. The 2010 facility was a Loan Against Property extended to the Corporate Debtor; the 2015 facility was an altogether different credit exposure extended to the Appellant, with the Corporate Debtor merely a guarantor. A restructuring that is “composite” only in the loose commercial sense of involving affiliated customers of the same bank does not, without more, operate in law to preserve a priority that depends on continuity of the very right, not continuity of the banking relationship. Indeed, BOM’s own letter dated 19.03.2015 required that the 2010 facility “be closed before implementation” of the fresh sanction — contemplating sequential closure and fresh creation, not seamless continuation. The composite-transaction argument does not, therefore, assist the Appellant.


# 63. The Appellant’s reliance on BOM Pune’s internal communication dated 06.04.2015 to BOM Ahmedabad, asserting that no second charge was to be ceded without approval of competent authority was correctly held immaterial, since that communication post-dates, and could not retrospectively unwind, rights that had already vested in IDBI Bank and BOB with effect from 16.01.2013. A bank’s unilateral, internal and subsequent communication to its own branch cannot extinguish or subordinate rights that third parties had already validly and irrevocably acquired.


# 64. Another Ground of the Appellant insofar as it relies on an alleged “modification of charge for the subject property by BOM, Ahmedabad on 12.07.2011,” stands on a different footing altogether: this assertion appears for the first time in the Appeal. It finds no mention in the Appellant’s own reply dated 18.07.2025 before the Adjudicating Authority, no place in the chronology recorded at paragraph 31.4 of the impugned order, and no corresponding Annexure is traceable in the present paper-book. A plea of fact neither pleaded nor proved below, unsupported by any document on the record of this appeal, cannot be permitted to be raised for the first time in appeal, more so where, if true, it concerns a document that would have been squarely within the possession of the Appellant or BOM and readily producible before the Adjudicating Authority. This limb of Ground is rejected.


# 65. On the issue that an assignee acquires every proprietary and contractual right of the assignor, and that assignment cannot diminish the rights attached to the assigned security does not, on examination, assist the Appellant; if anything, it confirms the correctness of the impugned order. The principle that an assignee steps into the shoes of, and can claim no greater right then, the assignor is precisely what the Adjudicating Authority applied at paragraphs holding that Areion Finserve and, in turn, Raj Radhe Finance, could acquire no more than the subordinate charge that BOM itself held.

Thus, Issue No 2 goes against the Appellant.


Issue No. 3: Whether the absence of registration of the IDBI Bank/BOB charge with the Registrar of Companies (“ROC”)/CERSAI, and the alleged non-consideration of Sections 77 and 79 of the Companies Act, 2013, renders the impugned order perverse or per incuriam?

# 66. The Appellant argued that in the absence of registration of the IDBI Bank/BOB charge with the ROC or CERSAI, that charge could never be perfected and cannot prevail over the mortgage traceable to BOM (which was itself registered with CERSAI on 17.10.2023 and with the ROC by Form CHG-1 dated 06.12.2023, culminating in a certificate of registration of modification of charge dated 15.02.2024), and that the impugned order, by not adverting to Sections 77 and 79 of the Companies Act, 2013, is perverse.


# 67. We find that this conflates two distinct legal consequences. Registration of a charge under Section 77 of the Companies Act, 2013 operates as constructive notice to persons dealing with the company and, under sub-section (3) thereof, renders an unregistered charge liable to be disregarded by the liquidator and by other creditors of the company. It is not, however, the mode of creation of the charge; the charge here was created by the underlying contract, the equitable mortgage effected through the NOC dated 10.09.2012 and the Memorandum dated 16.01.2013 and continues to bind the immediate parties to that transaction and those claiming through them with notice of it, regardless of registration. Sections 77 and 79 of the Companies Act, 2013 exist to protect the liquidator and other creditors dealing with the company without notice of an unregistered charge; they were not enacted to confer, upon a subsequent chargee who otherwise had notice (actual or constructive) of an earlier charge, a priority it could not otherwise claim.


# 68. We observe that it is the Liquidator, the very party for whose protection Section 77(3) exists , who does not invoke non-registration to defeat the priority of IDBI Bank and BOB; to the contrary, the Liquidator treated their charge as the first charge, consistent with which IDBI Bank and BOB duly lodged their claims and relinquished their security to the liquidation estate under Section 52 of the Code . It is only the Appellant, a stranger to the IDBI Bank/BOB charge, aligned with the subsequent mortgagee, who seeks to invoke Section 77(3) for a purpose the provision was not designed to serve, namely to elevate its own subsequently created and, on facts, subordinate mortgage. Independently, as urged by Respondent No. 8 before the Adjudicating Authority, if the true grievance was the correctness or completeness of the entries on the register of charges maintained by the ROC, the remedy lay in an application for rectification of the register of charges under Section 87 of the Companies Act, 2013, and not in resisting, in summary liquidation proceedings under Section 60(5) of the Code, a declaration necessary for administration of the liquidation estate. This finding on this issue is affirmed.


# 69. The allied contention that the impugned order is rendered per incuriam for not expressly citing Sections 77 and 79 of the Companies Act, 2013 is equally misconceived. An order is not per incuriam merely because it does not advert, in terms, to a statutory provision that, on a correct application of law as discussed above, would not in any event have altered the outcome.

In totality the No. 3 is accordingly answered against the Appellant.


Issue No. 4: Whether the pendency of Review Application No. 1 of 2020 against the DRT order dated 08.11.2019 detracts from the impugned order.

# 70. The Appellant argued that the Adjudicating Authority erred in treating the DRT’s order dated 08.11.2019 as conclusive, without regard to the pendency of Review Application No. 1 of 2020 filed by the Appellant against that order.


# 71. It is not disputed and nothing in the Appeal suggests otherwise that no order staying the operation of the DRT order dated 08.11.2019 has been obtained in the Review Application at any point since 2020. It is well settled that mere pendency of a review, revision or appeal does not, without an order of stay, suspend the operation or binding effect of the order under challenge; the order continues to bind the parties until set aside or stayed. The Adjudicating Authority was, therefore, correct to proceed on the footing that the findings in the order dated 08.11.2019 continued to hold the field.


# 72. In any event, the finding on priority does not rest solely, or even principally, on the DRT’s order; it independently follows from the documentary chronology the NOC dated 10.09.2012, the Memorandum dated 16.01.2013, the No Due Certificate dated 20.03.2015 and the contemporaneous Simple Mortgage Deed read with Section 48 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, as discussed under Issue No. 2 above. The DRT order was relied upon only as independent corroboration and not as the foundation of the finding. The pendency of the review therefore furnishes no ground to disturb the impugned order.

Issue No. 4 is accordingly answered against the Appellant.


Issue No. 5: Whether the impugned order suffers from internal inconsistency in simultaneously including the Sigma-9 Property in the liquidation estate and declining to set aside the assignment deeds dated 27.10.2023 and dated 02.05.2025?

# 73. It is the case of the Appellant that the impugned order is self-contradictory in simultaneously (a) declaring the Sigma-9 Property part of the liquidation estate and permitting the Liquidator to take custody under Section 35 of the Code, and (b) declining to set aside the Assignment Agreements dated 27.10.2023 and 02.05.2025, which are said to remain subsisting and valid; and that unless the impugned order is set aside, the charges created by those assignment deeds would be rendered infructuous.


# 74. On examination, no such inconsistency exists. The impugned order does two analytically distinct things: first, it declines to invalidate the Assignment Agreements dated 27.10.2023 and 02.05.2025 as transactions inter se between BOM, Areion Finserve and Raj Radhe Finance and second, it separately holds that the security interest which those assignments purported to carry , being, on Issue No 2 above, a mortgage subordinate to the first charge of IDBI Bank and BOB, and, on the findings on Issue (iii) of the impugned order, never realised or even intimated for realisation within the thirty-day window prescribed by Regulation 21A(1) of the IBBI (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016 — stood deemed, by operation of the proviso to Regulation 21A(1) read with Regulation 21A(3), to have lapsed into the liquidation estate .


# 75. We observe that these findings can co-exist without any conflict. An assignment may be a perfectly valid transaction as between assignor and assignee, transferring whatever the assignor held, while what was transferred (here, a subordinate charge that its holders never elected, in time, to realise outside liquidation) is, independently and by force of Regulation 21A, treated as part of the estate. The assignees are not left without a valid transaction for that reason; what they are left without is a security interest enforceable outside liquidation. That is a statutory consequence of Regulation 21A, not an inconsistency internal to the impugned order.


# 76. The security assigned under the two deeds was always subordinate and always liable to lapse for want of timely election under Section 52 of the Code. The impugned order does no more than record the legal consequence that necessarily follows from those antecedent findings.

Issue No. 5 is accordingly answered against the Appellant.


Issue No. 6: Whether the dismissal of I.A. No. 1137(AHM)2025 and the directions in I.A. No. 525(AHM)2026 call for interference by this Appellate Tribunal?

# 77. It remains to consider whether the dismissal of I.A. No. 1137(AHM)2025 and the directions in I.A. No. 525(AHM)2026 call for interference, on the Ground that rejection of a claim does not extinguish a mortgage and that no prejudice was caused to the liquidation process by the delay in question.


# 78. We need to appreciate that IA No. 1137(AHM)2025 was preferred by Raj Radhe Finance Limited, as assignee of Areion Finserve, challenging the Liquidator’s rejection of Areion Finserve’s claim under Section 42 of the Code. Raj Radhe Finance, as assignee, could acquire no better title to press that claim than Areion Finserve itself possessed. The delay and non-compliance with Regulation 21A that justified rejection of Areion Finserve’s claim equally infects the claim as pressed by its assignee. The dismissal of I.A. No. 1137(AHM)2025 calls for no interference, and, in any event, it is Respondent No. 8 who is directly bound by that dismissal; the Appellant does not, beyond what is already covered under Issue No 1 to 5 above, make out any independent ground of challenge to this part of the impugned order.


# 79. on the issue that rejection of a claim does not extinguish a mortgage, and that no prejudice was caused to the liquidation process by the delay, misconceives the basis of the finding. While rejection of a proof of claim does not, of itself and for all purposes, extinguish an underlying mortgage as a matter of general property law, the operative consequence here is not extinguishment of the mortgage in the abstract but the statutorily deemed consequence, under Regulation 21A(3) of the IBBI (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016, of failure to exercise the Section 52 option within the time prescribed. That consequence — the secured asset being brought into, and treated as part of, the liquidation estate follows by operation of the Regulation itself, and does not depend on demonstrated prejudice to the liquidation process, in the same manner that limitation bars a remedy irrespective of individualised prejudice.


# 80. The direction in I.A. No. 525(AHM)2026 for handing over of the original title deeds of the Sigma-9 Property to the Liquidator is the necessary corollary of the finding, affirmed above, that the property forms part of the liquidation estate and that the Liquidator is obliged, under Section 35(1)(b), (d) and (n) of the Code, to take custody and control of the assets and records of the Corporate Debtor. Custody of an immovable asset without custody of its title documents would render that statutory duty illusory. This direction, too, calls for no interference. The Issue No. 6 is accordingly answered against the Appellant.


Conclusion

# 81. For the reasons recorded above, none of the grounds urged on behalf of the Appellant whether going to the jurisdiction of the Adjudicating Authority, to the priority of mortgages, to the effect of non-registration of charges under the Companies Act, 2013, to the pendency of the DRT review, or to the internal consistency of the impugned order is found to have merit. In the result, the impugned Order doesn’t warrant any interference from this Appellate Tribunal.


# 82. The appeal fails and accordingly, dismissed. No order as to cost. Pending IA, if any stand closed.

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