Monday, 24 August 2026

Snehal Kamdar vs Suraksha Asset Reconstruction Ltd. and Anr. - Thus, the existence of a CoC resolution with requisite majority, is the statutory precondition for initiating liquidation under Section 33(2) of the Code. There is no such requirement under section 33(1) of the Code.

 NCLT Mumbai (2026.07.31) in  Snehal Kamdar  vs  Suraksha Asset Reconstruction Ltd. and Anr.  [(2026) ibclaw.in 2923 NCLT, IA(Liq.)/87/2024 in C.P. (IB)/987(MB)2020] held that;

  • Section 33(1) provides that where the Adjudicating Authority does not receive a resolution plan before the expiry of the CIRP period or the maximum period permitted for completion of the CIRP, it shall pass an order for liquidation of the Corporate Debtor. Whereas, Section 33(2) of the Code, provides that, at any stage during the CIRP, but before the approval of a resolution plan by the Adjudicating Authority, CoC may, in exercise of its commercial wisdom, pass resolution to liquidate the Corporate Debtor by a vote of not less than 66% of the voting share. Upon such decision being communicated by the RP to the Adjudicating Authority, the Adjudicating Authority is required to pass a liquidation order in terms of Section 33(1)(b). 

  • Thus, the existence of a CoC resolution with requisite majority, is the statutory precondition for initiating liquidation under Section 33(2) of the Code. There is no such requirement under section 33(1) of the Code.


Excerpts of the Order

# 1. The present Application has been filed under Section 33 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“the Code”) read with Regulation 14(B) of IBBI (Liquidation) Regulations, 2016 and read with Rule 11 of NCLT Rules, 2016 by the Resolution Professional, Mr. Snehal Kamdar (“Applicant/Resolution Professional”) of M/s. Sapphire Land Development Private Limited (“Corporate Debtor”), seeking the following reliefs:

  • “a. To pass order to liquidate the Corporate Debtor;

  • b.To appoint Mr. Snehal Kamdar, having IBBI Regn No: BBI/IPA 001/ IPPOO415/ 2017 - 18/10738 as the Liquidator of the Corporate Debtor;

  • c. To direct the COC members to ratify the fees incurred by the RP and the CIRP cost outstanding from the date of commencement of CIRP”


Facts as per the Application

# 2. A Petition under Section 7 of the Code was filed by Suraksha Asset Reconstruction Limited (“Respondent No.1”) against the Corporate Debtor, which was subsequently admitted by this Tribunal vide order dated 30.04.2021 thereby initiating the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (“CIRP”) against the Corporate Debtor. In terms of the said order, Mr. Ankur Kumar was appointed as the Interim Resolution Professional (“IRP”) of the Corporate Debtor. In accordance with Sections 13 and l5 of the Code, the Applicant published ‘Form A’ (Public Announcement) on 11.05.2021 in Mumbai Edition of Financial Express (English edition) and Pratahkal (Marathi edition) for the purpose of inviting claims from the Creditors of the Corporate Debtor. Further, according to the claims received, the Committee of Creditors (“CoC”) was constituted. The members of the CoC are as follows:

Sr No.

Name of CoC members

Amount admitted (in Cr)

Voting share (in percent)

1.

Suraksha Assets Reconstruction Limited

241.78

51.04%

2.

Unity Small Finance Bank Limited (PMC)

231.91

48.96%


# 3. The IRP was informed that the affairs of the Corporate Debtor were being handled by Adv. Sagar Shetty. However, despite repeated requests to Adv. Sagar Shetty and the suspended directors for the records and information of the Corporate Debtor, no cooperation was received. The CIRP of HDIL was commenced on 20.08.2019. Further, upon learning that the books of account were kept at the premises of Housing Development and Infrastructure Limited (HDIL), the IRP approached its Resolution Professional for the relevant records, but no information was furnished. The IRP also informed the Economic Offences Wing (EOW) of the commencement of the CIRP and sought details of the Corporate Debtor’s assets in its possession.


# 4. In the 2nd CoC Meeting held on 19.06.2021, the IRP apprised the CoC of the above developments, his proposed intervention before the 47th Metropolitan Magistrate Court, and the proposal to examine the sale of the yacht by Punjab and Maharashtra Co-operative Bank Ltd. as a preferential transaction.


# 5. In the 2nd CoC Meeting, Punjab and Maharashtra Co-operative Bank proposed the appointment of Mr. Snehal Kamdar as the Resolution Professional (“RP”) in place of the IRP. Accordingly, I.A. 1566 of 2021 was filed under Section 22(3)(b) of the IBC for his appointment as RP.


# 6. Pending orders on the said application, the IRP continued to discharge his duties and filed an application under Section 19(2) of the IBC against the erstwhile directors due to their continued non-cooperation.


# 7. As the CIRP period of 180 days was due to expire on 06.11.2021, the IRP informed the CoC of the need to seek a 90-day extension and requested approval for publication of Form G. However, in the 5th CoC Meeting, since the CoC did not approve publication of Form G, the IRP proposed initiation of liquidation proceedings against the Corporate Debtor.


# 8. The IRP informed the COC members that the erstwhile Punjab and Maharashtra Co-operative bank (PMC) bank has amalgamated with Unity Small Finance Bank Ltd (“Respondent No. 2”), from 25.01.2022. The IRP elaborating the status of the CIRP mentioned that after the 5thCoC meeting the CIRP period of 180 days ended on 06.11.2021, and that the CoC had not approved 90-day extension of CIRP period under Section 12(2) of the Code. Therefore, the IRP filed liquidation application bearing IA no 2857 of 2021 and thereafter, this Tribunal appointed the Applicant as RP vide order dated 01.06.2023, in I.A. 1566 of 2021.


# 9. In the 8th CoC Meeting held on 29.08.2023, the Applicant informed the CoC that he had taken charge of the records from the IRP, Mr. Ankur Kumar, on 17.06.2023. He further apprised the CoC of the assets standing in the name of the Corporate Debtor, including wetlands in Kerala requiring a survey, a yacht sold by Punjab and Maharashtra Co-operative Bank (with the panchnama and sale proceeds yet to be received), a Range Rover in the custody of the Enforcement Directorate/Economic Offences Wing, certain unidentified assets including shops in Dream Mall, and informed the CoC that extracts from the Registrar of Companies were required to ascertain the complete list of assets.


# 10. In the 9th CoC meeting held on 30.11.2023, the Applicant informed the CoC that an Application needs to be filed for extension of 90 days and exclusion of 740 days. In the said Meeting, the Applicant proposed publication of Form G in view of a prospective resolution applicant. While the Respondent no.2 supported publication of Form G, the Respondent no.1 sought liquidation. The CoC resolved to put the publication of Form G to vote and further decided that, if no prospective resolution applicant came forward within 30 days of its publication, the proposal for liquidation of the Corporate Debtor would be placed before the CoC.


# 11. In the 10th CoC Meeting held on 14.12.2023, the RP informed the CoC that the liquidation application filed by the erstwhile IRP had become infructuous due to procedural developments and changes in the status of proceedings. The Applicant states that the requisite voting threshold of 66% for publication of Form G could not be achieved, leaving liquidation as the only available course.


# 12. In the 11th CoC Meeting held on 02.01.2024, owing to the deadlock in the CIRP, the Applicant placed before the CoC three names for appointment as Liquidator. As the agenda also failed to secure the requisite approval, the RP proceeded to file a fresh application for liquidation. Also, in the 12thCoC meeting held on 01.04.2024, the Applicant put forth the earlier discussion regarding publication of Form G, extension and liquidation. The discussion regarding resolution of the Corporate Debtor was discussed at length in this meeting however the same did not receive requisite majority and hence the present application is filed for initiation of liquidation of the Corporate Debtor.


# 13. The Applicant submits that he consents to continue as Liquidator of the Corporate Debtor subject to clearance of the cost incurred by him and the CIRP cost incurred during the process, both by the COC members approximately to the tune of Rs. 25,03,196/-. Further, the Applicant’s consent form is annexed as Annexure-H with Application, to appoint him the Liquidator of the Corporate Debtor and fees be paid as per Regulation 4(2)(b) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Liquidation Process), Regulation, 2016. Thus, the Applicant prays that this application for liquidation may be considered and this Tribunal may direct the CoC members to clear the CIRP costs, before liquidator is appointed.


# 14. The Applicant further submits that the present Application was listed for hearing on 24.10.2024, wherein this Tribunal directed the Applicant to implead the CoC members as Respondents in the present IA. Accordingly, the Applicant has impleaded the CoC members as Respondents in the present IA.


Submissions of Respondent No.1:

# 15. Suraksha Asset Reconstruction Limited, the Respondent No.1, submits that post initiation of CIRP, the Respondent no.1 filed its claim with the IRP and thereafter the Respondent No.1 being a Financial Creditor was admitted into the CoC of the Corporate Debtor. At present, the Respondent No.1 is a member of CoC and holds 51.04% of voting share. Whereas, Respondent No.2, is other member of the CoC holding 48.96% of voting share.


# 16. The Respondent No. 1 submits that it has actively participated in the CoC meetings and voted in favour of extending the CIRP by 90 days beyond the initial 180-day period in the e-voting conducted pursuant to the 5th CoC Meeting held on 30.10.2021. However, the resolution failed as Respondent No. 2 abstained from voting. Thus no extension has been sought from this Tribunal.


# 17. In the 9th CoC Meeting held on 30.11.2023, Respondent No. 1 voted against publication of Form G and extension/exclusion of the CIRP period, resulting in failure of the resolutions for want of the requisite majority. Consequently, in the 10th CoC Meeting held on 14.12.2023, the Applicant informed the CoC that a liquidation application was required. While Respondent No. 1 supported the resolution for filing the liquidation application, Respondent No. 2 opposed it. In the 11th CoC Meeting held on 02.01.2024, the Applicant apprised the CoC that, since the CIRP period had expired and neither publication of Form G nor extension of the CIRP had been approved, liquidation proceedings were required to be initiated. The Applicant placed quotations from three Insolvency Professionals for appointment as Liquidator and clarified that he had not offered himself for the role to ensure transparency. The CoC decided to finalise the proposed Liquidator after evaluating the candidates through presentations.


# 18. Pursuant thereto, a presentation by Mr. Gaurang Shah was conducted on 24.01.2024, and by email dated 07.02.2024, Respondent No. 1 expressed its preference for his appointment as Liquidator. At the 12th CoC Meeting held on 01.04.2024, Respondent No. 1 reiterated its support for liquidation and again voted against publication of Form G, while Respondent No. 2 voted in favour.


# 19. Respondent No. 1 submits that, once the CoC declined publication of Form G, the Applicant ought to have promptly filed the liquidation application. By email dated 17.07.2024, Respondent No. 1 expressed concern over the delay and mounting CIRP costs. Although the Applicant subsequently informed the CoC that the present application had been filed, he proposed his own appointment as Liquidator despite having earlier declined to do so, and without any CoC resolution approving his appointment. Respondent No. 1 continues to support the appointment of Mr. Gaurang Shah as Liquidator.


# 20. Respondent No. 1 supports liquidation of the Corporate Debtor but opposes prayer clauses (b) and (c). It contends that the Applicant cannot seek directions regarding payment of CIRP costs and fees in a liquidation application and, in any event, has failed to substantiate the claim of Rs. 25,03,196/- with requisite pleadings, supporting documents, invoices or CoC approvals, as required under the Code, the Regulations and the IBBI Circular dated 12.06.2018. It is further submitted that the Applicant failed to effectively discharge his duties as Resolution Professional and is, therefore, not entitled to the claimed amount. While supporting liquidation due to the absence of any viable resolution and mounting CIRP costs, Respondent No. 1 opposes the Applicant’s appointment as Liquidator in view of the IBBI recommendation dated 18.07.2023, the Applicant’s earlier refusal to offer himself for the role, and the absence of CoC approval. It accordingly supports the appointment of Mr. Gaurang Shah as Liquidator.


Submissions of Respondent No.2 :

# 21. Respondent No. 2 submits that in the 8th and 9th CoC Meetings, the Applicant apprised the CoC of the records received from the erstwhile IRP, the assets of the Corporate Debtor, including approximately 39 shops at Dream Mall, and the lack of cooperation from the Administrator of Dream Mall, upon which Respondent No. 2 suggested filing an application for non-cooperation.


# 22. Respondent No. 2 contends that the Applicant failed to discharge his statutory duty under Regulation 36A of the CIRP Regulations by not publishing Form G despite voting in favour of its publication and the existence of assets with resolution potential. It is alleged that the Applicant wrongly treated publication of Form G as subject to CoC approval, misrepresented the legal position, and prematurely pursued liquidation. Respondent No. 2 further submits that, in the 12th CoC Meeting held on 01.04.2024, the Applicant sought the CoC’s decision on publication of Form G or liquidation pursuant to the directions of this Adjudicating Authority, although publication of Form G did not require CoC approval. While Respondent No. 1 supported liquidation, Respondent No. 2 opposed the proposal.


# 23. It is further contended that the liquidation application was filed without the requisite 66% CoC approval and without any resolution approving the Applicant’s appointment as Liquidator. Accordingly, Respondent No. 2 submits that the application is contrary to the IBC and liable to be rejected.


Rejoinder by the Applicant:

# 24. In addition to the main Application, the Applicant, by Rejoinder dated 12.06.2025, submits as follows:

a. Having faced a deadlock in the CIRP for over four years and exhausted all viable avenues for resolution, the Applicant filed the present liquidation application as a measure of last resort in discharge of his statutory duties. The Applicant submits that he diligently traced and identified assets of the Corporate Debtor that had not been discovered by the erstwhile IRP, including: (i) a 12-acre land parcel in Kerala, which he personally inspected with CoC representatives on 29.09.2023; and (ii) shops at Dream Mall, which he verified through a site visit and follow-up communications. Owing to non-cooperation from the Administrator and the RP of HDIL, the CoC directed initiation of proceedings under Section 19(2) of the IBC.

b. The Applicant further submits that legal action for recovery of the Dream Mall shops could be initiated only upon confirmation of the Corporate Debtor’s ownership, which the CoC undertook to verify but has not confirmed till date. It is further submitted that, after the CoC failed to approve extension of the CIRP or publication of Form G, the Applicant proposed three independent Insolvency Professionals as Liquidator and offered his own name only after the CoC failed to reach a consensus. The Applicant contends that the IBBI communication dated 18.07.2023 is recommendatory and not mandatory, and that he duly discharged his statutory duties, disclosed all fees and expenses to the CoC, personally incurred CIRP costs, and has yet to receive payment of his fees and expenses.


Analysis & Findings

# 25. We have heard Ld. Counsels for the parties and perused the record.


# 26. It is the case of the Applicant that although resolution for publication of Form- G for Invitation for Expression of Interest and Liquidation of the Corporate Debtor was placed before CoC for approval in CoC meetings, none of the issues has been approved by CoC with requisite percent of votes necessary for the same. The deadlock between the CoC members continued upto the expiry of CIRP period i.e. on 06.11.2021, with no extension sought. Hence, the present IA is filed for initiation of Liquidation process of the Corporate Debtor.


# 27. Per contra, the Respondent No. 1, holding 51.04% voting share in the CoC, though supports the liquidation of the Corporate Debtor, however, it opposes the appointment of the Applicant as Liquidator and instead proposes the appointment of Mr. Gaurang Shah, and further it disputes the Applicant’s claim towards RP’s fees and CIRP costs amounting to Rs. 25,03,196/- as being unsubstantiated. Whereas, the Respondent No. 2, holding 48.96% voting share in the CoC, opposes the liquidation of the Corporate Debtor. It contends that the Applicant acted contrary to Regulation 36A of the IBBI (CIRP) Regulations by treating publication of Form-G as subject to CoC approval and further submits that the present liquidation application has been filed without the requisite 66% CoC approval or any resolution approving the Applicant’s appointment as Liquidator.


# 28. To deal with the contentions of Respondent No.2, it is necessary to refer Section 25(2)(h) of the Code and Regulation 36A of IBBI (CIRP) Regulations, 2016 (as amended by IBBI (CIRP) (Fourth Amendment) Regulations, 2025 w.e.f. 26.05.2025):

  • Section 25-Duties of resolution professional.

  • (2) For the purposes of sub-section (1), the resolution professional shall undertake the following actions, namely:—

  • (h) invite prospective resolution applicants, who fulfil such criteria as may be laid down by him with the approval of committee of creditors, having regard to the complexity and scale of operations of the business of the corporate debtor and such other conditions as may be specified by the Board, to submit a resolution plan or plans;”

  • “Regulation 36A of IBBI (CIRP) Regulations, 2016

  • 36A. Invitation for expression of interest.

  • (1) The resolution professional shall publish brief particulars of the invitation for expression of interest in such form as notified by the Board through circular of the Schedule at the earliest, not later than sixtieth day from the insolvency commencement date, from interested and eligible prospective resolution applicants to submit resolution plans.”


# 29. As per Section 25(2)(h) of the Code, if the Committee of Creditors (CoC) has approved the criteria, as may be laid down by the Resolution Professional (RP), then the RP shall invite Prospective Resolution Applicants (PRAs). Thus, under Section 25(2)(h) of the Code, approval of the CoC is required for such criteria, on the basis of which the RP can invite PRAs. Further, on a bare perusal of Regulation 36A(1), it is evident that there are two obligations cast upon the RP under the said Regulation: (i) publication of the brief particulars of the invitation for Expression of Interest in the form notified by the IBBI, and (ii) such publication shall be made within 60 days from the insolvency commencement date. Thus, whereas Section 25(2)(h) mandates the invitation of Expressions of Interest in accordance with the eligibility criteria approved by the CoC, Regulation 36A(1) prescribes the procedure for such invitation. It is, therefore, evident that approval of the eligibility criteria by the CoC under Section 25(2)(h) is a prerequisite to the publication of Form G by the RP. Further, the Regulation does not override or dispense with the requirement under Section 25(2)(h), but is subservient to the said provision.


# 30. In the present case, at the 12th CoC Meeting held on 01.04.2024, the proposal for publication of Form G, along with the eligibility criteria for Prospective Resolution Applicants (PRAs), failed to secure the requisite approval, as Respondent No. 1, holding 51.04% voting share, did not vote in its favour. Accordingly, in the absence of approval of the eligibility criteria by the CoC, the Resolution Professional could not have proceeded with the publication of Form G, and therefore the related contention of the Respondent No.2 is not found to be acceptable.


# 31. It is further observed that Section 25(1) casts a duty upon the RP to preserve and protect the Corporate Debtor as a going concern while discharging the functions specified under section 25(2). In the present case, Respondent No.1 has categorically stated that the Corporate Debtor had no business operations, employees, or going concern status. In such circumstances, publication of Form-G and invitation of resolution applicants would not have materially advanced the objective of resolution.


# 32. The Respondent No.2 has contended that present liquidation application has nevertheless been filed without the requisite approval of 66% voting share of the CoC and therefore it is in violation of provision of Section 33(2) of the Code. In this regard, it is necessary to refer section 33 of the Code under which the present application is filed. Section 33 stipulates that:

  • Section 33-Initiation of liquidation.

  • (1) Where the Adjudicating Authority, —

  • (a) before the expiry of the insolvency resolution process period or the maximum period permitted for completion of the corporate insolvency resolution process under section 12, as the case may be, does not receive a resolution plan under sub-section (6) of section 30; or

  • (b) rejects the resolution plan under section 31 for the non-compliance of the requirements specified therein, it shall—

  • (i) pass an order requiring the corporate debtor to be liquidated in the manner as laid down in this Chapter;

  • (ii) issue a public announcement stating that the corporate debtor is in liquidation; and

  • (iii) require such order to be sent to the authority with which the corporate debtor is registered.

  • (2) Where the resolution professional, at any time during the corporate insolvency resolution process but before confirmation of resolution plan, intimates the Adjudicating Authority of the decision of the committee of creditors approved by not less than sixty-six percent of the voting share to liquidate or dissolve the corporate debtor, the Adjudicating Authority shall pass a liquidation order as referred to in sub-clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) to liquidate (ii), (iii), (iv) and (v) of clause (b) of sub-section (1).

  • Explanation- For the purposes of this sub-section, it is hereby declared that the committee of creditors may take the decision to liquidate the corporate debtor, any time after its constitution under sub-section (1) of section 21 and before the confirmation of the resolution plan, including at any time before the preparation of the information memorandum.”


# 40. Section 33(1) provides that where the Adjudicating Authority does not receive a resolution plan before the expiry of the CIRP period or the maximum period permitted for completion of the CIRP, it shall pass an order for liquidation of the Corporate Debtor. Whereas, Section 33(2) of the Code, provides that, at any stage during the CIRP, but before the approval of a resolution plan by the Adjudicating Authority, CoC may, in exercise of its commercial wisdom, pass resolution to liquidate the Corporate Debtor by a vote of not less than 66% of the voting share. Upon such decision being communicated by the RP to the Adjudicating Authority, the Adjudicating Authority is required to pass a liquidation order in terms of Section 33(1)(b). Thus, the existence of a CoC resolution with requisite majority, is the statutory precondition for initiating liquidation under Section 33(2) of the Code. There is no such requirement under section 33(1) of the Code.


# 41. Having regard to the above provisions, it is necessary to examine the facts of the case and applicability of relevant provisions for liquidation of the Corporate Debtor. In the present case, the Corporate Debtor was admitted into CIRP vide order dated 30.04.2021 and the initial period of 180 days of CIRP expired on 06.11.2021. Neither any extension of the period of CIRP was thereafter sought nor any resolution plan has been received by the Adjudicating Authority under section 30(6) of the Code. Under these facts and circumstances, provisions of section 33(1) of IBC would be applicable and not the provisions of section 33(2) of the Code as contended by the Respondent No.2. Therefore, the contentions of the Respondent No.2 regarding passing of resolution by CoC with requisite majority before filing an application for liquidation of the Corporate Debtor is not applicable in this case.


# 42. Insofar as prayer clause (b) is concerned, Respondent No. 1 has proposed Mr. Gaurang Shah to be appointed as Liquidator and it has also communicated its preference for his appointment as Liquidator vide email dated 07.02.2024.


# 43. In the present case, no resolution approving liquidation or recommending the appointment of a Liquidator has been passed by the CoC with the requisite majority. The Applicant has volunteered his own name for appointment as Liquidator, whereas Respondent No. 1, despite supporting the initiation of liquidation, has opposed the Applicant’s appointment and instead proposed another Insolvency Professional. In these circumstances, and in the absence of any valid recommendation of the CoC, this Adjudicating Authority is not inclined to appoint either the Applicant or the Insolvency Professional proposed by Respondent No. 1 as the Liquidator of the Corporate Debtor. Accordingly, prayer clause (b) seeking the appointment of the Applicant as Liquidator is rejected.


# 44. As regards prayer clause (c), Respondent No. 1 contends that the Applicant cannot seek directions for payment of the Resolution Professional’s fees and CIRP costs in an application filed for liquidation of the Corporate Debtor. Having considered the rival contentions, it is observed that the present application is primarily seeking liquidation of the Corporate Debtor, and no substantive arguments have been advanced on behalf of the Applicant with respect to the claim for CIRP costs and fees. Further, no supporting documents with CoC ratification, have been referred by the Applicant for the claim of CIRP costs and fees. Accordingly, this Adjudicating Authority is not inclined to adjudicate upon the said issue in the present proceedings. The question relating to the payment of the CIRP costs and the Resolution Professional’s fees is kept open and shall be considered independently, if and when the Applicant files an appropriate application. Accordingly, with the above direction, the prayer clause (c) stands disposed of.


# 45. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, particularly considering that the CIRP commenced on 30.04.2021 and the prescribed CIRP period expired on 06.11.2021 without any extension being sought, that no resolution plan has been submitted to this Adjudicating Authority under Section 30(6) of the Code, and that the Corporate Debtor has ceased operations and is no longer a going concern, this Adjudicating Authority is of the considered view that the Corporate Debtor is liable to be liquidated under Section 33(1)(a) of the Code, and accordingly, liquidation proceedings deserve to be initiated in accordance with Chapter III of the Code. Accordingly, the Corporate Debtor is ordered to be liquidated and following consequential order is passed.


ORDER

a) The Corporate Debtor, Sapphire Land Development Private Limited is directed to be liquidated in accordance with the provisions of Chapter III of the Code and applicable regulations. Consequently, the Applicant/RP stands relieved subject to procedural/necessary compliances under Section 34(5) of the Code.

b) In view of discussion at Para No.42 and Para No.43 of this order, we deem it appropriate to appoint an Insolvency Professional from the panel of Insolvency Professionals shared by the IBBI, as Liquidator in this case. Accordingly, Mr. Manish Shah bearing Registration No. IBBI/IPA-001/IP-P00094/2017-18/10194; having address at A/502, Krishna Palace, Thakur Complex, Kandivali (East), Mumbai, Maharashtra ,400101, e-mail id: mdshah0211@gmail.com having AFA valid upto 30.06.2027, is appointed to act as the Liquidator in terms of Section 34(1) of the Code.

c) That the Liquidator shall initiate the liquidation process as envisaged under Chapter III of the Code and the Liquidation Process Regulations applicable on the date of passing of this order. He shall take control of all the assets of Corporate Debtor and also continue or institute proceedings in respect of an avoidance transactions or fraudulent or wrongful trading, if any, as per section 35(1)(l) of the Code.

d) The liquidator for conduct of the Liquidation proceedings will be entitled to the fees as per the Regulation 4 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016, applicable on the date of passing of this order.

e) The Committee of Creditors constituted under section 21 shall continue to function during the liquidation process as per Regulation 8 of the IBBI (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016.

f) A fresh moratorium shall commence under Section 33(1)(iv) of the Code.

g) The Liquidator shall issue public announcement stating that the Corporate Debtor is in liquidation.

h) This Order shall be deemed to be a notice of discharge to the officers, employees and workmen of the Corporate Debtor, except when the business of the Corporate Debtor is continued during the liquidation process by the Liquidator.

i) The Liquidator shall submit a Preliminary Report to the Adjudicating Authority within 30 days from the liquidation commencement date as per Regulation 13 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016. The Liquidator shall also submit progress reports as per Regulation 15 of the Liquidation Process Regulations.

j) The Liquidator is hereby authorised to represent the Corporate Debtor before the Government Authorities, if required.

k) Registry shall furnish a copy of this Order within seven days from the passing of this Order to the following:

  • a. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India;

  • b. Regional Director (Western Region), Ministry of Corporate Affairs;

  • c. Registrar of Companies, Mumbai-I;

  • d. Official Liquidator attached to Bombay High Court;

  • e. Erstwhile Resolution Professional, Mr. Snehal Kamdar.

  • f. Liquidator, Mr. Manish Shah.


# 46. Accordingly, the I.A(LIQ.)/87/2024 is allowed in above terms and stands disposed of.

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Monday, 17 August 2026

Rajaram Food Products India Ltd. Vs. Joint District Registrar (Class-1) and Collector of Stamps, Nashik and Ors. - Thus, Section 17(2)(xii) of the Registration Act applies in the facts of the present case in favour of the petitioner. The liquidator conducting sale by way of public auction under the provisions of the IBC and on the orders of the NCLT, certainly qualifies to be an officer covered under the said provision i.e. Section 17(2)(xii) of the Registration Act.

 HC Bombay (2026.07.14) in  Rajaram Food Products India Ltd. Vs. Joint District Registrar (Class-1) and Collector of Stamps, Nashik and Ors.  [(2026) ibclaw.in 4001 HC, Writ Petition No. 3018 of 2026] held that;

  • Section 17(2)(xii) of the Registration Act squarely applies. Therefore, the position of law clarified by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab and another vs. Ferrous Alloy Forgings P. Ltd. and others (supra) applies in favour of the petitioner, so long as only a copy of the said sale certificate issued to the petitioner, is to be entered in Book No.1, as per Section 89(4) of the Registration Act.

  • Thus, Section 17(2)(xii) of the Registration Act applies in the facts of the present case in favour of the petitioner. The liquidator conducting sale by way of public auction under the provisions of the IBC and on the orders of the NCLT, certainly qualifies to be an officer covered under the said provision i.e. Section 17(2)(xii) of the Registration Act.


Excerpts of the Order

The petitioner is an auction purchaser, aggrieved by an order dated 16.02.2026 passed by respondent No.1 (the said order), whereby the petitioner has been directed to pay stamp duty on the sale certificate issued in its favour in pursuance of an auction sale. According to the petitioner, on a proper reading of the provisions of the Registration Act, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the Registration Act) and the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the Stamp Act), along with judgements of the Supreme Court and this Court, the respondent No.1 has erred in insisting upon the petitioner to pay stamp duty on the sale certificate, even when the said certificate is only to be entered in Book No.1, as mandated under Section 89(4) of the Registration Act.


# 2. A corporate debtor M/s. Gonglu Agro Pvt. Ltd. underwent Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) under the provisions of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC). But, the CIRP did not result in a successful resolution plan and accordingly, by an order dated 05.01.2024, the National Company Law Tribunal, Chennai (NCLT) directed liquidation of the said corporate debtor. Respondent No.5 was appointed as liquidator on the corporate debtor for sale of its assets. An e-auction was held on 30.12.2024 with regard to the specific immovable property of the corporate debtor and in the auction, the petitioner emerged as the successful bidder. Consequently, upon the petitioner depositing the entire consideration, a sale certificate dated 30.01.2026 was issued in favour of the petitioner.


# 3. On 03.02.2026, respondent No.5 – liquidator sent an email along with copy of sale certificate to respondent No.1 – Joint District Registrar (Class-1) & Collector of Stamps and respondent No.2 – Sub-Registrar, for necessary action under Section 89(4) of the Registration Act. The petitioner also submitted a representation dated 02.02.2026 to the said respondents as well as respondent No.3 – Inspector General of Registration and Controller of Stamps, relying upon the judgements of the Supreme Court, to contend that the sale certificate was exempted from compulsory registration and as per statutory requirement under Section 89(4) of the Registration Act, it was to be merely entered in Book No.1, with no stamp duty payable thereon.


# 4. On 16.02.2026, respondent No.1 passed the said order, holding that the sale certificate having been issued in pursuance of proceedings conducted under the IBC, attracted payment of stamp duty under Article 16 of Schedule I of the Stamp Act. In that light, the representation submitted by the petitioner was filed. The petitioner filed an appeal before the Deputy Inspector General of Registration and Deputy Collector of Stamps, Nashik Division, to challenge the said order passed by respondent No.1. But, the appeal was dismissed as not maintainable, on the ground that the order passed by respondent No.1 did not determine or compute any stamp duty payable.


# 5. In this backdrop, the petitioner filed the present writ petition. Respondent Nos.1 to 3 filed their affidavit-in-reply, referring to provisions of the Registration Act and Stamp Act, to contend that no interference was warranted in the said order and that the petitioner is liable to pay stamp duty on the sale certificate. The writ petition was taken up for hearing.


# 6. Dr. Chandrachud, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the said order is erroneous on a plain reading of the provisions of the Registration Act. It was submitted that the Supreme Court, in the case of State of Punjab and another vs. Ferrous Alloy Forgings P. Ltd. and others, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3372, had categorically held that such a sale certificate issued in pursuance of auction sale conducted by an authorized officer, was not compulsorily registrable and that the law required only a copy of the same to be forwarded to the registering authority, further holding that stamp duty was not attracted in such a situation. The said position of law had been consistently followed by this Court in various cases, including in the cases of Vishal Laxman Arkal vs. Inspector General of Registration and others, 2025 SCC Online Bom 4727 and Khush Housing Finance Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra, (order dated 27.01.2026 passed in Writ Petition No.3692 of 2023).


# 7. It was further submitted that in the reply affidavit filed on behalf of respondent Nos.1 to 3, for the first time, reliance was placed on Maharashtra Amendment to the Registration Act, whereby clauses (f), (g) and (h) were added to Section 17(1) of the Registration Act. In this context, learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon a document tendered in a compilation of documents, showing that by Maharashtra Act No. X of 2012, which received assent of the President on 25.05.2012, the aforesaid amendment had been inserted in Section 17(1) of the Registration Act. The respondents relied upon clause (g) of sub-section 1 of Section 17 of the Registration Act, to contend that since the sale certificate had been issued by an officer or competent authority under a recovery Act, stamp duty was necessarily payable.


# 8. In order to deal with the aforesaid specific contention raised on behalf of the respondents, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon judgements of the Supreme Court in the cases of Glas Trust Company LLC vs. Byju Raveendran and others, (2025) 3 SCC 625, Tottempudi Salalith vs. State Bank of India and others, (2024) 1 SCC 24 and Hindustan Construction Company Limited and another vs. Union of India and others, (2020) 17 SCC 324. It was submitted that in the said judgements, the Supreme Court had made it abundantly clear that IBC is not a debt recovery legislation, but it has been enacted for the purpose of revival of a company that has fallen in debt.


# 9. It was submitted that even otherwise, Section 17(2)(xii) of the Registration Act exempted a sale certificate issued to a purchaser of any property sold by public auction by a Civil or Revenue Officer. It was submitted that in the present case, the liquidator acting under the provisions of the IBC and upon orders passed by the NCLT, qualifies as a Civil officer and therefore, exemption from payment of stamp duty is evident from a proper interpretation of the relevant provisions. On this basis, it was submitted that the writ petition deserved to be allowed.


# 10. On the other hand, Mr. Chandurkar, learned Addl. GP appearing on behalf of respondent Nos.1 to 4, submitted that as per Section 2(g)(iv) of the Stamp Act, the sale certificate signified a conveyance by means of an instrument, as defined in Section 2(l) thereof. Consequently, as per Section 3 of the Stamp Act read with Article 16 of Schedule I thereof, stamp duty was leviable at the rate specified therein. It was submitted that clause (g) of sub-section 1 of Section 17 of the Registration Act, concerning Maharashtra Amendment, clearly covers the position in favour of the said respondents and therefore, no error can be attributed to the said order.


# 11. It was submitted that when these provisions are appreciated in the correct perspective, the judgements of the Supreme Court and this Court, relied upon by the petitioner, cannot come to its aid, thereby demonstrating that the writ petition deserves to be dismissed.


# 12. We have considered the rival submissions. In the light of the contentions raised on behalf of the rival parties, it would be appropriate to refer to the relevant statutory provisions. Section 17 of the Registration Act pertains to documents of which registration is compulsory. Sub-section (1) enumerates the documents that are compulsorily required to be registered and sub-section (2) gives the details of documents that are exempted from such compulsory registration. Section 89 of the Registration Act pertains to those orders, certificates and instruments, copies of which are only required to be sent to the registering officers and filed.


# 13. Section 17(1)(g) of the Registration Act, as per the Maharashtra Amendment No.X of 2012, copy of which is tendered in a compilation of documents by the learned counsel for the petitioner; Sections 17(2)(xii) and 89 thereof, read as follows:

  • ‘17. Documents of which registration is compulsory.

  • (1) The following documents shall be registered, if the property to which they relate is situate in a district in which, and if they have been executed on or after the date on which, Act No. XVI of 1864, or the Indian Registration Act, 1866, or the Indian Registration Act, 1871, or the Indian Registration Act, 1877, or this Act came or comes into force namely:-

  • xxx xxx xxx

  • (g) sale certificate issued by any competent officer or authority under any recovery Act;’

  • ‘(2) Nothing in clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) applies-

  • xxx xxx xxx

  • (xii) any certificate of sale granted to the purchaser of any property sold by public auction by a Civil or Revenue Officer.’

  • ‘89. Copies of certain orders, certificates and instruments to be sent to registering officers and filed.—

  • (1) Every officer granting a loan under the Land Improvement Loans Act, 1883 (19 of 1883), shall send a copy of his order to the registering officer within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the whole or any part of the land to be improved or of the land to be granted as collateral security, is situate, and such registering officer shall file the copy in his Book No. 1.

  • (2) Every Court granting a certificate of sale of immovable property under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), shall send a copy of such certificate to the registering officer within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the whole or any part of the immovable property comprised in such certificate is situate, and such officer shall file the copy in his Book No. 1.

  • (3) Every officer granting a loan under the Agriculturists’ Loans Act, 1884 (12 of 1884), shall send a copy of any instrument whereby immovable property is mortgaged for the purpose of securing the repayment of the loan, and, if any such property is mortgaged for the same purpose in the order granting the loan, a copy also or that order, to the registering officer within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the whole or any part of the property so mortgaged is situate, and such registering officer shall file the copy or copies as the case may be, in his Book No. 1.

  • (4) Every Revenue Officer granting a certificate of sale to the purchaser of immovable property sold by public auction shall send a copy of the certificate to the registering officer within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the whole or any part of the immovable property comprised in the certificate is situate, and such officer shall file the copy in his Book No. 1.’


# 14. Section 2(g) of the Stamp Act states that the conveyance includes conveyance on sale, every instrument, every decree or order of a Civil Court and every order, inter alia, made by the NCLT under specific provisions of the Companies Act and the IBC by which property whether movable or immovable, is transferred to any person. Section 2(l) of the Stamp Act defines instrument as including every document by which any right or liability is created, transferred, limited, extinguished, etc. or purports to do so. Section 3 of the Stamp Act pertains to an instrument chargeable with duty and it specifically refers to instruments mentioned in Schedule I. Article 16 of Schedule I of the Stamp Act refers to a certificate of sale issued in the context of the property sold in a public auction by Civil or Revenue court, with the extent of stamp duty payable thereon.


# 15. In the impugned order passed by respondent No.1, while rejecting the contentions of the petitioner, reference is made only to Article 16 of Schedule I of the Stamp Act and it is held that stamp duty is payable on sale certificate issued to the petitioner. It is significant to note that in the impugned order, there is no reference to Section 17(1)(g) of the Registration Act, introduced by way of Maharashtra Amendment. In other words, respondent Nos.1 to 3 have sought to defend and justify the impugned order in their affidavit on reasons and grounds not found in the impugned order itself. As per settled law, the impugned order could be defended only on the reasons found therein.


# 16. Nonetheless, this Court has considered the rival submissions made in that regard. Since the petitioner heavily relies upon judgements of the Supreme Court and this Court in the context of the question of liability to pay stamp duty on a sale certificate only sought to be entered in Book No.1 under Section 89(4) of the Registration Act, it would be appropriate to refer to the said judgements.


# 17. In the case of State of Punjab and another vs. Ferrous Alloy Forgings P. Ltd. and others (supra), the Supreme Court considered the earlier judgements and found that it was already a settled position of law that a sale certificate does not require registration under Section 17(2)(xii) of the Registration Act and that it also does not attract stamp duty. A copy of the sale certificate is simply required to be entered in Book No.1, as per Section 89(4) of the Registration Act, so long as the sale certificate remains as it is. It was further held in the said judgement that only when the auction purchaser uses the certificate for some other purpose, that stamp duty would be payable.


# 18. The relevant portion of the judgement of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab and another vs. Ferrous Alloy Forgings P. Ltd. and others (supra), reads as follows:

  • ‘13. The short question that falls for our consideration in this appeal is whether it is mandatory for the successful auction purchaser to deposit the stamp duty for the sale certificate to be issued to it in view of the provisions of the Stamp Act and the Registration Act.

  • 14. This Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Pramod Kumar Gupta, (1991) 1 SCC 633 : AIR 1991 SC 401, after examining the relevant provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, observed that the title to the property put on auction sale passes under the law when the sale is held. The owners and certain other interested persons are afforded opportunity under the CPC to assail the sale and make a prayer for setting aside the sale on certain enumerated grounds. However, once such objections are disposed of without disturbing the sale, the sale stands confirmed under Order XXI Rule 92 of the CPC. Thereafter, the sale certificate is issued under Order XXI Rule 94. The Court observed that this chronology of events made it clear that the transfer becomes final when an Order under Rule 92 of Order XXI is made and the issuance of a sale certificate under Rule 94 is only a formal declaration of the effect of such confirmation. Such issuance of certificate does not create or extinguish any title and thus would not attract any stamp duty which is applicable qua an instrument of sale of immovable property.

  • 15. In Smt. Shanti Devi L. Singh v. Tax Recovery Officer, (1990) 3 SCC 605 : AIR 1991 SC 1880, this Court observed that since the certificate of sale is not a compulsorily registrable document in lieu of Section 17(2)(xii) of the Registration Act, the transfer of title in favour of the auction purchaser would not be vitiated on account of non-registration of the sale certificate.

  • 16. In B. Arvind Kumar v. Govt. of India, (2007) 5 SCC 745, this Court observed that when a property is sold by public auction in pursuance of an order of the court and the bid is accepted and the sale is confirmed by the court in favour of the purchaser, the sale becomes absolute and the title vests in the purchaser. A sale certificate is issued to the purchaser only when the sale becomes absolute. The sale certificate is merely the evidence of such title. It is well settled that when an auction-purchaser derives title on confirmation of sale in his favour, and a sale certificate is issued evidencing such sale and title, no further deed of transfer from the court is contemplated or required. Although in the said case, the sale certificate was registered yet this Court proceeded to observe that a sale certificate issued by a court or an officer authorized by the court, does not require registration. Section 17(2) (xii) of the Registration Act, 1908 specifically provides that a certificate of sale granted to any purchaser of any property sold by a public auction by a civil or revenue officer does not fall under the category of non-testamentary documents which require registration under sub-section (b) and (c) of Section 17(1) of the said Act.

  • 17. The position of law is thus settled that a sale certificate issued to the purchaser in pursuance of the confirmation of an auction sale is merely evidence of such title and does not require registration under Section 17(1) of the Registration Act. It is not the issuance of the sale certificate which transfers the title in favour of the auction purchaser. The title is transferred upon successful completion of the sale and its confirmation by the competent authority after all the objections against the sale have been disposed of.

  • 18. Recently, a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Esjaypee Impex Private Limited v. The Asst. General Manager and Authorized Officer Canara Bank, (2021) 11 SCC 537 observed that the mandate of law that flows from a combined reading of Sections 17(2)(xii) and 89(4) of the Registration Act respectively is that the auction purchaser is entitled to receive the original sale certificate and a copy of the same is required to be forwarded to the Sub-Registrar for the purpose of filing in Book 1 as per the Registration Act.

  • 19. In Inspector General of Registration v. G. Madhurambal, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 2079, a two-Judge Bench of this Court observed that the consistent position of law is that a certificate of sale cannot be regarded as a conveyance subject to stamp duty. The Court further observed that once a direction is issued for the duly validated certificate to be issued to the auction purchaser with a copy forwarded to the registering authorities to be filed in Book I as per Section 89 of the Registration Act, it has the same effect as registration and requirement of any further action is obviated.

  • 20. The position of law discussed above makes it clear that sale certificate issued by the authorised officer is not compulsorily registrable. Mere filing under Section 89(4) of the Registration Act itself is sufficient when a copy of the sale certificate is forwarded by the authorised officer to the registering authority. However, a perusal of Articles 18 and 23 respectively of the first schedule to the Stamp Act respectively makes it clear that when the auction purchaser presents the original sale certificate for registration, it would attract stamp duty in accordance with the said Articles. As long as the sale certificate remains as it is, it is not compulsorily registrable. It is only when the auction purchaser uses the certificate for some other purpose that the requirement of payment of stamp duty, etc. would arise.’


# 19. The said judgement was followed by this Court in the case of Vishal Laxman Arkal vs. Inspector General of Registration and others (supra), even when the case arose from auction sale conducted under the provisions of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (Securitisation Act). The said position was further followed by this Court in the case of Khush Housing Finance Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra (supra). It is significant to note that when the said judgements were delivered by a Division Bench of this Court, relying upon the position of law clarified by the Supreme Court in the aforementioned judgement in the case of State of Punjab and another vs. Ferrous Alloy Forgings P. Ltd. and others (supra), the respondent – State authorities made no reference to Section 17(1)(g) of the Registration Act (Maharashtra Amendment). As noted hereinabove, even in the impugned order, the respondent No.1 did not refer to and rely upon the same.


# 20. It is in this backdrop that the true purport of Section 17(1)(g) of the Registration Act (Maharashtra Amendment) will have to be appreciated, in the light of position of law clarified by the Supreme Court. A perusal of the same shows that it refers to a sale certificate issued by any competent authority or officer under any recovery Act. It is to be noted that although this clause pertains to sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the Registration Act pertaining to the documents that are compulsorily registrable, there is no reference to ‘auction sale’ or ‘public auction’. As opposed to this, in clause (xii) of subsection (2) of Section 17, which pertains to documents exempted from registration, there is a specific reference to public auction and it is specified therein that any certificate of sale granted to a purchaser of any property sold by ‘public auction’ by a Civil or Revenue officer, is exempted from registration.


3 21. If this distinction is taken into consideration and applied to the facts of the present case, we find that since the sale certificate in the present case was issued in favour of the petitioner, with regard to the subject property sold by public auction by the liquidator under the provisions of the IBC, Section 17(2)(xii) of the Registration Act squarely applies. Therefore, the position of law clarified by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab and another vs. Ferrous Alloy Forgings P. Ltd. and others (supra) applies in favour of the petitioner, so long as only a copy of the said sale certificate issued to the petitioner, is to be entered in Book No.1, as per Section 89(4) of the Registration Act.


# 22. The position of law clarified in paragraph No.20 of the abovequoted portion of judgement of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab and another vs. Ferrous Alloy Forgings P. Ltd. and others (supra), clearly applies in favour of petitioner. Therefore, the sale certificate issued in favour of petitioner is not compulsorily registrable. Only a copy of the same is required to be entered in Book No.1, as per Section 89(4) of the Registration Act. So long as the sale certificate remains as it is with the petitioner, it is neither required to be registered, nor does it attract stamp duty. It is only when the petitioner seeks to use the sale certificate for some other purpose, that the requirement of payment of stamp duty would arise.


# 23. In this context, when the prayer clauses of the present writ petition are perused, it is found that apart from seeking to set aside the said order passed by respondent No.1, the petitioner has sought a direction to respondent Nos.1 and 2 to accept the sale certificate issued by the liquidator and to file the same in Book No.1, as mandated under Section 89(4) of the Registration Act, without insisting upon payment of stamp duty or registration fee. We find that the said reliefs claimed in the present petition, are in consonance with the law laid down by the Supreme Court in this context.


# 24. As far as Section 17(1)(g) of the Registration Act (Maharashtra Amendment) is concerned, a perusal of the said provision shows that it pertains to a sale certificate issued by a competent officer or authority under any ‘recovery Act’. We find considerable force in the submission made on behalf of the petitioner that the IBC cannot be categorized as a recovery Act, in the light of the objects and reasons for which it was enacted. In the cases of Glas Trust Company LLC vs. Byju Raveendran and others (supra); Tottempudi Salalith vs. State Bank of India and others (supra) and Hindustan Construction Company Limited and another vs. Union of India and others (supra), the Supreme Court has reiterated the position of law with regard to the nature and purpose of enactment of IBC, relying upon earlier judgement in the case of Swiss Ribbons Private Limited and another vs. Union of India and others, (2019) 4 SCC 17 and other judgements, to hold that IBC is not meant to be a recovery mechanism and that it is not a debt recovery legislation. On the other hand, it has been repeatedly held that it is a mechanism for revival of a company fallen in debt. Therefore, the respondents are not justified in relying upon Section 17(1)(g) of the Registration Act, to justify the impugned order.


# 25. Even otherwise, as noted hereinabove, the said provision does not refer to a sale certificate issued in pursuance of sale of a property by public auction, while the exemption clause i.e. Section 17(2)(xii) of the Registration Act specifically pertains to such a sale certificate issued to a purchaser of property sold by public auction. Thus, Section 17(2)(xii) of the Registration Act applies in the facts of the present case in favour of the petitioner. The liquidator conducting sale by way of public auction under the provisions of the IBC and on the orders of the NCLT, certainly qualifies to be an officer covered under the said provision i.e. Section 17(2)(xii) of the Registration Act.


# 26. Thus, viewed from any angle, we find that respondent No.1 could not have passed the impugned order, insisting upon payment of stamp duty on the sale certificate issued in favour of the petitioner. The contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner were not dealt with and respondent No.1 was not justified in ignoring the aforesaid position of law by simply relying upon Article 16 of Schedule I of the Stamp Act.


# 27. In view of the above, the impugned order deserves to be set aside and the writ petition deserves to be allowed.


# 28. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed in terms of prayer clauses (a) to (c), which read as follows:

  • ‘a. Issue a Writ of Certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order, or direction calling for the records and proceedings leading to the issuance of the Impugned Order/Letter No.772/2026 dated 16.02.2026 issued by Respondent No. 1, and after examining the legality and validity thereof, be pleased to QUASH and SET ASIDE the same as being illegal, arbitrary, and contrary to the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court;

  • b. Issue a Writ of Mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order, or direction, directing Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 to forthwith accept the Sale Certificate dated 30.01.2026 issued by the Liquidator (Respondent No. 5) and file the same in Book No. 1 as mandated under Section 89(4) of the Registration Act, 1908, without insisting on the payment of stamp duty or registration fees;

  • c. Declare that the Sale Certificate dated 30.01.2026 issued by the Liquidator under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, is not a compulsorily registrable document under Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908, and is exempt from the payment of stamp duty when filed under Section 89(4) of the said Act;’


# 29. In accordance with the position of law clarified by the Supreme Court in paragraph No.20 of the said judgement in the case of State of Punjab and another vs. Ferrous Alloy Forgings P. Ltd. and others (supra), exemption from payment of stamp duty on the sale certificate issued to the petitioner, will continue to apply, so long as the same remains as it is. It is only when the petitioner uses it for some other purpose, that the requirement of payment of stamp duty, will arise.


# 30. Writ petition is disposed of in above terms. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.

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