Showing posts with label section-52-security-interest. Show all posts
Showing posts with label section-52-security-interest. Show all posts

Wednesday, 19 November 2025

HDFC Bank Ltd. Vs. Shailendra Ajmera - When the statues itself provides for deeming class the Registration under the e- Vahan Portal has to be treated covered by Regulation 21 (Sub Clause C). Appellant is held to have security interest in the vehicles and claim of the Appellant was required to be accepted as Secured Creditor.

 NCLAT (2025.11.12) in HDFC Bank Ltd. Vs. Shailendra Ajmera [Comp. App. (AT) (Ins) No. 355 of 2025] held that; 

  • - When the Section 20A, sub section 2 uses the expression “shall be deemed to be registered” with the Central Registry of the Tribunal, the effect shall be deemed to be registered with the Central Registry for the Corporate Asset. 

  • - When 03.05.2019 declared the date for integration and law provides deeming clause we fail to see why the Registration under the Vahan Portal cannot be accepted Registration under the SARFAESI Act 2002 and that is the clarification issued by the Government of India. 

  • - When the statues itself provides for deeming class the Registration under the e- Vahan Portal has to be treated covered by Regulation 21 (Sub Clause C).

  • - Appellant is held to have security interest in the vehicles and claim of the Appellant was required to be accepted as Secured Creditor.


Excerpts of the Order;

12.11.2025 Heard Learned Counsel for the Appellant as well as earned Counsel appearing for Respondent. This appeal has been filed  against an order dated 20.02.2025 passed by the Learned National Company Law Tribunal, New Delhi, Bench Court 3 by which order of C.A. No. 20/2021 filed by the HDFC Bank has been rejected. Brief facts of the case are: The CIRP against the Corporate Debtor, M/s Quality Limited commenced on 11.12.2018. Order of liquidation was passed on 11.01.2021, Appellant filed its claim in form B for total sum of Rs. 1,07,06,706/- claiming security interest in four vehicles with four loan accounts, the liquidator declined to recognise the Appellant’s claim as secured relying on the judgment of this Tribunal Volkswagen Finance Private Limited Vs. Shree Balaji Printopack Pvt. Ltd. 2020 SCC Online NCLAT 729. Challenging the decision of the liquidator C.A. IB No. 20/2021 was filed by the Appellant which came to be dismissed by the impugned order, aggrieved by the order 20.02.2025 this appeal has been filed.


# 2. Learned Counsel for the Appellant submits that the vehicles with regard to which claim was filed has been registered in the Vahan Portal e- Services which registration was made reflecting the HDFC Bank as Financer. It is submitted that the Registration in Vahan Portal has to be treated Registration under SARFAESI Act 2002 by virtue of integration of Registration system in Vahan Portal consequent to the notification issued by Central Govt. dated 03.05.2019 which was issued in exercise of power under sub- Section 2 of Section 20 of the SARFAESI Act, 03.05.2019 was fixed as date of integration system of the registration system of Central Registry with the Vahan National Register. He submits that her clarification has also been issued by Reserve Bank of India on 04.10.2019 with regard to the registration of vehicles shall be treated to be registration under SARFAESI Act and the liquidator committed error in rejecting the claim of secured creditor.


# 3. Shri. Sanjay Bhatt, Learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent Liquidator rejecting the submissions submitted that the clarification which has been relied by the Appellant dated 04.10 .2019 at best provide that Vahan Registry shall be deemed to be registered with the Central Registry with the purposes of SARFAESI Act 2002 but said Registration cannot be relied in the IBC. It is submitted that the registration was required to be made under Section 77 of the Companies Act 2013 as has been held by Adjudicating Authority. It is further submitted that the judgment of this Tribunal in Volkswagen Finance Private Limited has rightly been relied by Adjudicating Authority in rejecting the claim of Secured Creditor.


# 4. We have considered the submission of the Counsel for the parties and perused the record, from the submissions of the parties and record following facts are undisputed:-

  • 1. The Registration of Security interest with regard to four vehicles for which claim was filed in form B where registered on Vahan e- Portal.

  • 2. The claim was filed by the Appellant in form B Relying in Registration of Vahan e-portal of the vehicle claiming security interest

  • 3. The adjudicating authority rejected the claim of the Appellant relying on the judgment of Volkswagen Finance Pvt. Ltd.


# 5. The question which has cropped for consideration in this appeal is as to whether Registration of vehicle in Vahan e-portal shall be treated to be registration within meaning of SARFAESI Act 2002. Learned Counsel for the Appellant has relied on section 52 of the IBC, which provides as follows: 

  • “52. Secured creditor in liquidation proceedings.–

  • (3) Before any security interest is realised by the secured creditor under this section, the liquidator shall verify such security interest and permit the secured creditor to realise only such security interest, the existence of which may be proved either—

  • (a) by the records of such security interest maintained by an information utility; or

  • (b) by such other means as may be specified by the Board.”


# 6. The Regulation has been relied namely Liquidation Regulation 2016 and reliance has been placed by Appellant on Regulation 21 which provides as follows:

  • “21. Proving security interest- The existence of a security interest may be proved by a secured creditor on the basis of

  •  (a) the records available in an information utility, if any;

  •  (b) certificate of registration of charge issued by the Registrar of Companies; or 

  • (c) proof of registration of charge with the Central Registry of Securitisation Asset Reconstruction and Security Interest of India.


# 7. The board has provided provision for proving security interest under Regulation 21 and one of the mode under sub clause (C) is the proof of Registration of charge with Central Registry and Assets Reconstruction Security India is one of the accepted board of probing the charge. The submissions advance by both the parties are divergent in so far as nature of Registration and consequence of Registration on the e-Vahan Portal is concerned.

# 8. Section 20A provides for integration of Registration System with Central Registry Section 20A is as follows: 

  • 20A. (1) The Central Government may, for the purpose of providing a Central database, in consultation with State Governments or other authorities operating registration system for recording rights over any property or creation, modification or satisfaction of any security interest on such property, integrate the registration records of such registration systems with the records of Central Registry established under section 20, in such manner as may be prescribed

  • Explanation.—For the purpose of this sub-section, the registration records includes records of registration under the Companies Act, 2013 (18 of 2013), the Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958 (44 of 1958), the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988), the Patents Act, 1970 (39 of 1970), the Designs Act, 2000 (16 of 2000) or other such records under any other law for the time being in force.

  • (2) The Central Government shall after integration of records of various registration systems referred to in sub-section (1) with the Central Registry, by notification, declare the date of integration of registration systems and the date from which such integrated records shall be available; and with effect from such date, security interests over properties which are registered under any registration system referred to in sub-section (1) shall be deemed to be registered with the Central Registry for the purposes of this Act.]


# 9. Under Section 20A sub Section 2 the notification has been issued by the Central Government dated 03.05.2019 notification dated 03.05.2019 reads as follows:

  • “S.O. 1695(E)- In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (2) of section 20A of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (54 of 2002), the Central Government hereby declare the day of 3rd May, 2019 as the date of integration of the registration system of Central Registry with the VAHAN National Register, the registration system of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, and the date from which such integrated records in so far as it relates to registration of vehicle shall be available.”


# 10. The above notification clearly provides that, 03.05.2019 is the integration of the Registration System of Central Registry with the Vahan National Register. The clarification issued by RBI dated 04.10.2019 has also been brought on record where clarification the Government of India provided in Item No.1 which is as follows:

Sl. No

Issues pertaining to registration of charges under SARFAESI Act, 2001

Clarification by GOI


Registration of Vehicles on CERSAI.

As per the notification issued by DFS on 03.05.2019 about integration of the VAHAN motor vehicles registry with CERSAI, registration of charges relating to motor vehicles is to be made only on the VAHAN registry and not on the Central Registry (CERSAI). Any Vehicle registered with the VAHAN registry shall

be deemed to be registered with the Central Registry for the purposes of the SARFAESI Act, 2002.


# 11. The submission Counsel for the Liquidator has been that the Registration as per the clarification issued by the Government of India is that the Registration is for the purposes of SARFAESI Act and cannot be relied in the Liquidation Proceedings.


# 12. As noted above, Regulation 21 of Sub Clause C provides proving of Security interest by Registration under the SARFAESI Act when integration of Registry under Vhan e-Portal has been provided by notification dated 03.05.2019 and is contemplated by Section 20 A, we see no reason to not accept the registration under e-Vahan Portal as a registration within the meaning of SARFAESI Act 2002. When the Section 20A, sub section 2 uses the expression “shall be deemed to be registered” with the Central Registry of the Tribunal, the effect shall be deemed to be registered with the Central Registry for the Corporate Asset. When 03.05.2019 declared the date for integration and law provides deeming clause we fail to see why the Registration under the Vahan Portal cannot be accepted Registration under the SARFAESI Act 2002 and that is the clarification issued by the Government of India. When the statues itself provides for deeming class the Registration under the e- Vahan Portal has to be treated covered by Regulation 21 (Sub Clause C). Coming to the judgment of the ‘Volkswagen Finance Private Limited’ on which reliance has been placed by the Counsel for the Respondent as well as adjudicating authority, in the said judgment, there was no claim of any registration under the SARFAESI Act which fact has been noticed in Paragraph 29 where the court has held that “It is also an admitted fact that charge was not registered under Central Registry of Asset Reconstruction and Security Interest of India Para 29 is as follows:

  • “29. From the documentary evidence on record it is clear that no 'Charge' has been registered under the provisions of Section 77(1) of the Companies Act, 2013, in relation to the Subject Property. The Liquidator has rightly referred to Regulation 21 of IBBI (Liquidation Process) Regulation, 2016 and observed that the Appellants 'Claim' was not supported by any evidence as prescribed under the said Regulation. It is also an admitted fact that the 'Charge' was not registered under Central Registry of Securitization Asset Reconstruction and Security Interest of India. We are keeping the ratio of the aforenoted Judgements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and Section 52(3) of the Code read with Regulation 21(c) of the (Liquidation Process), Regulations, 2016, in view. We are of the considered opinion that the contentions of the Learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant that Registration with Motor Vehicle Authority under Section 51 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 would suffice, cannot be sustained. Section 51(1) of the MV Act, 1988 only provides for "entry" in the Certificate of Registration regarding the agreement. The Section provides how to deal with the entry. To reiterate, in the instant case, as the 'Security Interest' was neither registered with the Information Utility'; nor under Section 125 of the Companies Act, 1956/Section 77 of the Companies Act, 2013; no Application was preferred under Section 87 of the Companies Act, 2013; 'Charge' was not registered in the Securitisation Asset Reconstruction and Security Interest of India, we are of the opinion that Section 52(3) (b) of the Code and Regulation 21(b) of the (Liquidation Process), Regulation, 2016 are not complied with and the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Kerala State Financial Enterprises Ltd. (Supra) and this Tribunal in India Bulls Finance Ltd. (Supra) is squarely applicable to the facts of this case. Hence, we hold that when in present matter 'Charge' was not registered as per the provisions of Section 77(1) of the Companies Act, 2013 and as envisaged under the Code, the Creditor cannot be treated as a 'Secured Creditor"


# 13. Thus, in the Volkswagen Finance Private Limited Case there was no claim for registration under SARFAESI Act hence the said judgment does not lead to any assistance in the present case with the case of the Respondent more so this Tribunal in Volkswagen Finance Private Limited was not considering the Registration under SARFAESI Act 2002, specially integration of Registry to the Vahan Portal. Counsel for the Appellant has also relied on another judgment of this Tribunal in Company Appeal Ins. 210 of 2024 in Bizloan Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Mr. Amit Chandrashekhar Poddar [Liquidator For Autocop (India) Private Limited] decided on 03.07.2025 where this Tribunal has occasion to consider the Registration under SARFAESI Act and has considered Regulation 21 and in Para 29 of the judgment followed has been laid down: 

  • “29. From above, we note that the Central Registry of Securitisation Asset Reconstruction and Security Interest of India (CERSAI) was set up under section  20 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act, 2002). CERSAI is a centralised online platform created by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) to maintain records of all types of securities interests created over any type of property, including movable and immovable properties and it acts as a comprehensive database that stores details of all securitisations, reconstructions, and security interests created by banks and other financial institutions. We understand that CERSAI helps lenders to check whether a property has already been used as collateral before granting loans to borrowers, thus CERSAI helps in reducing fraudulent activities such as multiple financing, benami transactions, and others and provides transparency and efficiency in the loan processing system, making it easier for lenders to track and manage their assets.”


# 14. The above judgments do support the submissions of the Appellant. In view of the above reasons and conclusions, we are of the view that the impugned order cannot be sustained. Appellant is held to have security interest in the vehicles and claim of the Appellant was required to be accepted as Secured Creditor. We set aside the impugned order. We allow the appeal and set aside the impugned order 20.02.2025 and allow CA 20/2021 declaring the Appellant as Secured Creditor.

----------------------------------------------------



Notification - Integration of E-Vahan with CERSAI

MINISTRY OF FINANCE

(Department of Financial Services)

NOTIFICATION

New Delhi, the 3rd May, 2019


S.O. 1695(E).—In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (2) of section 20A of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (54 of 2002), the Central Government hereby declare the day of 3rd May, 2019 as the date of integration of the registration system of Central Registry with the VAHAN National Register, the registration system of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, and the date from which such integrated records in so far as it relates to registration of vehicle shall be available.


[F. No. 3/2/2019 -DRT]

VANDITA KAUL, Jt. Secy.


Friday, 7 February 2025

Avil Menezes (Liquidator) Vs Hinduja Leyland Finance Ltd. - That after enforcement of right under Section 52 of the Code by one of the secured creditors, no other secured creditor can enforce his right subsequently. Thus, only one secured creditor can enforce his right to realise its debt out of secured assets under Section 52 of the Code.

 NCLAT. (2025.01.21) in Avil Menezes (Liquidator) Vs Hinduja Leyland Finance Ltd. [(2025) ibclaw.in 55 NCLAT, Comp. App. (AT) (Ins) No. 555 of 2024] held that;.

  • Where it was held that the right to realise security under Section 52 of the Code is restricted to a creditor that has an ‘exclusive charge’ or ‘sole first charge’ like UCO Bank Consortium in present case.

  • Section 48 of the TP Act establishes a fundamental principle that no individual can transfer a title greater than what he possess. This means that if a transferor conveys the same property to multiple transferees, each transferee will hold rights equivalent to those of the previous transferee. The doctrine dictates that once a transfer is initiated, the transferor cannot disregard prior grants or engage with the property without acknowledging existing rights.

  • “While enacting a statute, the Parliament cannot be presumed to have taken away a right in property. Right to property is a constitutional right. Right to recover the money lent by enforcing a mortgage would also be a right to enforce an interest in the property.

  • Section 77 of the Companies Act, 2013 cannot be the basis for treating a creditor as unsecured as long as the security was created in terms of Section 3(31) of the Code.

That after enforcement of right under Section 52 of the Code by one of the secured creditors, no other secured creditor can enforce his right subsequently. Thus, only one secured creditor can enforce his right to realise its debt out of secured assets under Section 52 of the Code.

  • Sections 52 and 53 of the Code must be read together, and also Section 53(2) expressly states that contractual arrangement inter-se creditors must be disregarded. Only if the asset is charged exclusively to a particular creditor then Section 52 can be given effect.


Excerpts of the Order;

# 1. The present appeal has been filed by the Appellant Avil Menezes who is Liquidator of Sunil Hitech and Engineers Limited (‘Corporate Debtor’) against the Impugned Order dated 19.12.2023 under Section 61 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (‘Code’) passed by the National Company Law Tribunal, Mumbai Bench-I (‘Adjudicating Authority’) in I.A. No. 699 of 2021 in CP (IB) 2295/NCLT/MB/2018.


# 2. M/s Hinduja Leyland Finance Limited is the Respondent herein.


# 3. The Adjudicating Authority vide its order dated 10.09.2018 initiated Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (‘CIRP’) against the Corporate Debtor and subsequently based on the Resolution Professional’s application, the Adjudicating Authority passed an order for liquidation of the Corporate Debtor under Section 33 of the Code vide order dated 25.06.2019.


# 4. The Appellant issued a public announcement as per Regulation 12 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016 (“Liquidation Regulations”) in several newspapers and received claim of Rs. 30,89,42,646/- from the Respondent on 26.11.2019. It has been brought out that Corporate Debtor has availed certain credit facilities from Tata Capital Financial Service Limited (“TCFSL”) against the movable assets which were exclusively charged in favour of the TCFSL. The Appellant submitted that the credit facilities were duly paid by the Corporate Debtor and TCFSL by way of closure letter dated 24.03.2017 confirmed that the financial facilities stood repaid in the books of TCFSL.


# 5. The Appellant submitted that the Corporate Debtor has availed financial assistance from a consortium led by UCO Bank Consortium comprising of various banks and financial institutions amounting to Rs. 1970 Crores and entered into an Original Working Capital Consortium Agreement (“Consortium Agreement”) dated 05.12. 2006. Similarly, the Corporate Debtor in UCO Bank consortium had entered into Original Joint Deed of Hypothecation (“Hypothecation Agreement”) dated 04.12.2006 (as amended from time to time), whereby the Corporate Debtor had created charge on the movable assets in favour of the UCO Bank consortium.


# 6. It is the case of the Appellant that UCO Bank consortium had charge on all the movable assets of the Corporate Debtor subsequent to release of charge by TCFSL on 24.03.2017,


# 7. The Appellant submitted refinancing facilities were availed by the Corporate Debtor from the Respondent and the charge over the movable assets was created by the Corporate Debtor in favour of the Respondent on 30.11.2017 for which charge was already crystalized in favour of the UCO Bank consortium much earlier.


# 8. The Respondent vide an email dated 31.12.2019 sent to the Appellant about his intent to realise the movable assets of the Corporate Debtor and in opinion of the Appellant, the assets mentioned by the Respondent were originally financed by TCFSL and on satisfaction of loan of TCFSL, the charge on movable assets of the Corporate Debtor were crystalised in favour of the UCO Bank consortium based financial facilities from UCO Bank Consortium and way of various loan and hypothecation deeds.


# 9. The Appellant submitted that the Respondent and the Corporate Debtor had entered into several loan agreements between 01.09.2016 to 30.11.2017 by way of refinancing against the movable assets of the Corporate Debtor. The Appellant clarified that the movable assets which has been claimed by the Respondent as charge in favour of the Respondent remained unidentified and as the Respondent did not provide any details of such assets at the time of submission of the claims.


# 10. The Appellant brought out that the Respondent, after four months of the liquidation commencement, communicated to the Appellant vide letter dated 28.11.2019 about his decision to realise his security interest on the movable assets in accordance with Section 52 of the Code. The Appellant submitted that he vide an e-mail dated 18.12.2019 requested the Respondent to furnish a no objection certificate from UCO Bank consortium which Respondent failed to furnish and therefore, the Appellant vide an email dated 31.12.2019 rejected the claim of the Respondent to realise the movable assets.


# 11. The Appellant stated that the Respondent, aggrieved by the decision of the Appellant in rejecting the respondent’s claim, filed an Interlocutory Application bearing IA No. 699 of 2021 under Section 42 r/w 16(5) of the Code before the Adjudicating Authority and the Adjudicating Authority vide Impugned Order dated 19.12.2023 allowed the IA No. 699 of 2021 of the Respondent and hence the present appeal before us has been filed by the Appellant.


# 12. The Appellant explained that one of the pre conditions for availing the financial facilities from the UCO Bank consortium was that the Corporate Debtor will create security interest by way of Hypothecation in favour of UCO Bank consortium. The Corporate Debtor executed various hypothecation agreement with the UCO Bank consortium creating the first pari-pasu charge overall the assets including the movable assets of the Corporate Debtor. Accordingly, both the parties entered into Joint Deed of Hypothecation on 04.12.2006 (as amended from time to time), whereby the Corporate Debtor created charge on assets of the Corporate Debtor in favour of the UCO Bank consortium. The Appellant amplified that UCO Bank consortium charge had all the movable assets of the Corporate Debtor present and further which happened subsequent to discharge of the charge of the Corporate Debtor under common agreement with TCFSL.


# 13. The Appellant submitted that the Respondent communicated decision to realise its security interest and after going through all the relevant documents provided by the Respondent, the Appellant came to the conclusion that assets mentioned by the Respondent were originally financed by the TCFSL and on satisfaction of loan of TCFSL the charge of movable assets were crystalised in favour of the UCO Bank consortium and thus, the Respondent could not have valid charge on these movable assets.


# 14. The Appellant submits that as per Section 48 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (“TP Act”) in case for same assets, different charges are created then earlier created charge will be binding, in absence of any contra special contract. The Appellant conceded that although Section 48 of the TP Act is w.r.t., immovable assets, the wordings of Section 48 of the TP Act makes it apparent that the principle of priority expressed in Section 48 of the TP Act is equally applicable to immovable assets. The Appellant stated that when two or more instruments are created over the same immovable property, then the rights created by the subsequent instrument shall be subject to the rights created by the prior instrument unless such is excluded by a reservation in the prior instrument as a result of a special contract.


# 15. The Appellant stated that the Adjudicating Authority has erred in observing that there has been consistent understanding between the Corporate Debtor and the UCO Bank Consortium that the assets financed including refinanced by the lenders remained outside the Consortium lenders shall be charged in favour of such financer and the UCO Bank Consortium shall have only second charge over such assets.


# 16. The Appellant submits that the said clause in relevant agreement and 8th Supplemental Deed of Working Capital Consortium Agreement dated 12.06.2016 does not entitle the re-financers to have 1st charge over the assets which was already existing with the Corporate Debtor at the time of further loan availed by the Corporate Debtor from the Respondent. The Appellant submitted that the second charge of the UCO Bank Consortium will only be limited to the new assets purchased by the Corporate Debtor through a fresh credit facility. However, this relevant clause does not refer to the existing assets which are re-financed by a financer as these existing assets are already part of the estate of the Corporate Debtor and these assets are not being introduced to the estate of the Corporate Debtor because of such refinancing. The Appellant stated that the Adjudicating Authority wrongly interpreted the said clause in allowing the claims of the Respondent.


# 17. The Appellant submitted that at the time of creating exclusive charge over the Movable Assets, the Respondent was duty bound to obtain no-objection certificate from the UCO Bank Consortium, however, the Respondent failed to provide no-objection certificate from the UCO Bank Consortium.


# 18. The Appellant submitted that in absence of a no-objection certificate for creating an exclusive charge, the charge of the Respondent became a subservient charge holder and in view of the decision of the UCO Bank Consortium to relinquish their rights in favour of the liquidation estate, the Movable Assets formed part of the liquidation estate of the Corporate Debtor. The Appellant cited judgment of this Appellate Tribunal in the matter of J.M. Financial Solution Private Limited and Ors., passed in Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 593 of 2019, where it was held that the right to realise security under Section 52 of the Code is restricted to a creditor that has an ‘exclusive charge’ or ‘sole first charge’ like UCO Bank Consortium in present case.


# 19. The Appellant submitted that in absence of the NOC from the UCO Bank Consortium, the Respondent does not have any exclusive or sole first charge over the Movable Assets of the Corporate Debtor, therefore, the Respondent is not entitled to realize the Movable Assets under Section 52 of the Code.


# 20. The Appellant further stated that the Adjudicating Authority, while directing the Appellant to handover the movable assets to the Respondent, failed to observe that the Respondent could not even identify the assets charged in favour of the Respondent. The Appellant submits that in order to resolve the situation and identify the movable assets, the Respondent had visited the office premises of the liquidator of the company on 12.12.2019 whereby the Respondent requested for the entire list of traceable/available assets of the Corporate Debtor. The Appellant accordingly provided the entire list of traceable/available assets of the Corporate Debtor and consequently, the Respondent vide an email dated 17.12.2019 stated he was able to identify 14 assets out of the total 291 purported movable assets allegedly charged to the Respondent.


# 21. The Appellant stated that several assets of the Corporate Debtor have model numbers which are synonymous with that of the movable assets provided by the Respondent and hence it was absolute necessary for the Respondent to provide details pertaining to machine number or chassis number or registration number etc as required under Section 52 of the Code. However, the Loan Documents provided by the Respondent did not have the complete set of information with respect to the movable assets that were charged to it, in fact the column for the description of the movable assets was not filled by the Respondent and the same was left blank.


# 22. Concluding his arguments, the Appellant urged this Appellate Tribunal to dismiss the Impugned Order and allow his appeal.


# 23. Per contra, the Respondent denied all the averments made by the Appellant in the present appeal.


# 24. The Respondent submitted that between 19.03.2015 to 30.11.2017, the Respondent provided financial assistance and refinanced the movable assets of the Corporate Debtor aggregating Rs. 38,96,50,000/- against the specific movable assets under the said refinance scheme and the assets against which the loan was availed were exclusively charged to the Applicant.


# 25. The Respondent further submitted that the UCO Bank Consortium never had charge on the said movable assets. The Respondent elaborated that the said movable assets of the Corporate Debtor were originally financed by TCFSL and refinanced by the Respondent. TCFSL, and now Respondent has exclusive charge over the said movable assets of Schedule ‘K’ of his agreement. The Respondent submitted that the said movable assets which were financed by TCFSL were mortgaged/Charged by the Corporate Debtor exclusively in favour of TCFSL, in favour of the Respondent.


# 26. Explaining the background of his financial assistance to the Corporate Debtor, the Respondent stated that the Corporate Debtor was in need of additional funds and to get better terms on existing charge, therefore the Corporate Debtor approached the Respondent for financial assistance by way of re-finance on the said movable assets which were prior financed by TCFSL.


# 27. The Respondent explained that while refinancing the loan, the Respondent had also obtained NOC dated 24.03.2017 from TCFSL and thereafter created charge over the existing unencumbered specific assets. The exclusive charge was created in favour of the Respondent and necessary charge has been registered with the Registrar of Companies (‘RoC’).


# 28. The Respondent emphatically submitted that TCFSL and now Respondent has exclusive charge over the said movable assets and the UCO Bank Consortium has no charge on the said movable assets as alleged by the Appellant, thus, the question of obtaining NOC from UCO Bank Consortium does not arise.


# 29. The Respondent submitted that the Appellant had issued public announcement on 01.07.2019 inviting the claims from Creditors and the Respondent filed his Claim on 26.07.2019. The Appellant vide email dated 24.09.2019 requested for computation of claim and KYC of authorised officer of the Respondent which were furnished by the Respondent to the Appellant. The Respondent vide letter dated 28.11.2019, informed the Appellant that the Respondent desires to realise his security interest i.e. movable assets.


# 30. The Respondent submitted that Claims of the Respondent were admitted by the Appellant on 29.11.2019 vide email dated December 2019 and requested the Respondent for Inspection report, NOC obtained at the time of refinancing . The Respondent vide email dated 20.12.2019, provided the NOC obtained from earlier lender and requested details, however, vide email dated 31.12.2019, the Appellant has raised the alleged contention that charge got crystallized in favour of UCO Bank Consortium i.e. after around 6 months from the commencement of the CIRP of the Corporate Debtor.


# 31. The Respondent submitted that the 8th Supplemental Deed of working capital consortium agreement dated 13.06.2016, executed between the UCO Dank Consortium and Corporate Debtor does not affect the rights of the Respondent as first charge holder on movable assets of the Corporate Debtor.


# 32. The Respondent submitted that the UCO Bank Consortium did not possess any charge over the said movable assets, which were financed by TCFSL, and refinanced by the Respondent and thus there is no question of UCO Bank Consortium’s holding pari passu charge over the said movable assets getting crystallized, as alleged by Appellant. This Respondent stated that the Respondent has exclusive charge over the said movable assets.

33. Concluding his arguments, the Respondent submitted that the Appeal is liable to be dismissed with costs.


Findings

# 34. We note that from 17.06.2014 to 30.06.2014, the Corporate Debtor availed financial facilities from TCFSL and financed certain movable assets (around Rs. 20 Crores) which were exclusively charged in favour of TCFSL. The Corporate Debtor repaid the said loan, after which TCFSL issued a closure letter dated 24.03.2017 confirming that the facilities were repaid.


# 35. We take into consideration the fact that on 05.12.2006, the corporate debtor entered into an Original Working Capital Consortium Agreement with UCO Bank as the lead bank along with 13 other banks (the “UCO Bank Consortium”). The working capital limit was gradually enhanced to Rs. 1970 Crores. The UCO Bank Consortium’s security included hypothecation of the corporate debtor’s present and future assets, both movable and immovable assets.

# 36. We note that on 10.09.2018, CIRP was initiated against the Corporate Debtor and subsequently on 25.06.2019, the Liquidation Order was passed. The Respondent filed their claims for Rs. 30,89,42,626/- on 26.07.2019 and the Appellant vide an email dated 13.09.2019 acknowledged the claims and sought further details. The Respondent on 28.11.2019 wrote to the Appellant seeking to realise the security as per Section 52(1)(b) of the Code. In the email dated 12.12.2019, the Appellant gave the asset list for reconciliation, however, vide an email dated 17.12.2019, the Respondent could identify only 14 assets out of 291 movable assets and sought more time to identify remaining assets. The Appellant, vide email dated 18.12.2019, informed the Respondent that the loan agreements provided by the Respondent did not specify the Serial No./Chassis No./Machine No, therefore, the Appellant could not map the said assets loan-wise. The Appellant also requested the Respondent to furnish Inspection Report at the time of loan sanction, NOC at the time of refinancing and Invoices against the sanction letter.


# 37. We observe that on 31.12.2019, the Appellant sent an email stating that TCFSL initially financed the movable assets and thereafter on 24.03.2017, the loan was repaid by the Corporate Debtor and a closure letter was issued to the Corporate Debtor by TCFSL, hence, the charge stood crystallised in favour of the UCO Bank Consortium based on hypothecation deed of UCO Bank Consortium with the Corporate Debtor as amended from time to time. The Appellant asked the Respondent to submit the NOC obtained from the UCO Bank Consortium. On 07.10.2020, the Respondent, instead of providing NOC of UCO Bank Consortium and identifying all charged assets, issued a letter stating that there was no requirement to obtain NOC from UCO Consortium Bank. The Appellant vide letter dated 15.10.2020 informed the Respondent that while the Respondent’s claims as a creditor have been admitted, the Respondent’s charge is subservient to the First Pari-Passu charge of UCO Bank Consortium, especially in the absence of the NOC taken from UCO Bank Consortium while refinancing the movable assets. On 22.02.2021, the Respondent filed I.A. 699 of 2021 before the Adjudicating Authority to realise the assets purportedly charged in favour of the Respondent under Section 52 of the Code.


# 38. It is the case of the Appellant that the Respondent could not identify the assets and also that the Respondent is a subservient charge holder to the UCO Bank Consortium and cannot realise its security interest under Section 52 of the Code. The Adjudicating Authority while passing the Impugned Order dated 19.12.2023, despite noting that no NOC was taken from the UCO Bank Consortium, concluded that the assets re-financed by Respondent were outside the UCO Bank Consortium lenders charged assets and the UCO Bank Consortium gad only second charge as collateral security.


# 40. It is significant to note that the UCO Bank Consortium had the first Pari-passu charge over the movable assets based on third schedule of 8th Supplemental Deed of Working Capital Consortium Agreement after the loan stood repaid to TCFSL by the Corporate Debtor. We note that subsequently after 8 months on 30.11.2017, the Respondent refinanced the movable assets of the Corporate Debtor aggregating to Rs 38,96,50,000/-.


# 41. We have noted that 3rd Schedule of 8th Supplemental Deed of Working Capital Consortium Agreement has four (4) clauses, each creating the first charge in favour of the UCO Bank Consortium. However, paragraph 4.1 of the Impugned Order only reproduces Clauses 1 and 4, i.e., regarding the first pari-passu charge on the fixed assets and by collateral security. It is significant to note that Clause 2 directly creates the first pari-passu charge through hypothecation on the movable assets “present as well as the future” assets of the Corporate Debtor. Clause 2 does not contain any exclusions in respect of assets financed by loans from other banks and also encompasses “… all any other charge over the movable and immovable properties of the borrower remained to be mentioned here shall be treated as Member Banks are having first Pari-passu charge over the same.”


# 42. We further note that Clause 3 of 8th Supplemental Deed of Working Capital Consortium Agreement also creates the first pari-passu charge as primary security through hypothecation and states that the UCO Bank Consortium would have first pari-passu charge by way of primary security over the proceeds arising in connection with the other securities. Clause 3 create a first right over the proceeds from the sale of movable properties, which are the subject matter of the present appeal.


# 43. Thus, it become clear that Clauses 1 and 4, which contain the exclusion clause for assets purchased fixed by financing term loans outside the UCO Bank Consortium of the 8th Supplemental Deed of Working Capital Consortium Agreement can create the first charge over the fixed assets in exclusion to UCO Bank Consortium. In other words the assets need to be new as well as fixed assets to fall under Clause 1 or even Clause 4 of the 8th Supplemental Deed of Working Capital Consortium Agreement. Therefore, it is quite logical to come to conclusion that if existing assets especially, movable assets are re-financed, by any subsequent financer/ lender as against financed for new additional fixed assets for Corporate Debtor, then the re-financer will not have any first charge over existing movable assets which are already stood charged (as first charge) in favour of the UCO Bank Consortium. Therefore, it appears that the Adjudicating Authority ignored Clauses 2 and 3, which creates the first charge by hypothecation in respect of present and future assets, without any exclusions. Thus, we unable to see adequate reasons in the Impugned Order holding that “ We find that it has been consistent understanding with the lenders that the assets financed by lenders outside the Consortium lenders shall be charged in favor of such financier and the Consortium shall have only second charge as collateral security”.


# 44. We have carefully noted that it is the case of the Respondent’s that the first pari-passu charge in terms of Clauses 1 and 4 has a carve-out, i.e., “… excluding assets financed by availing Term Loan outside the consortium and other bankers having exclusive charge on fixed assets of the Borrower in addition to the Property which is mentioned in the Mortgage Deed to cover entire Facilities.” At this stage, we recall the pleading that the Respondent could not clarify about the Respondent’s purported charge by way of hypothecation and therefore, the corresponding clauses in the agreement with UCO Bank Consortium, expressly create charge by hypothecation, i.e., Clauses 2 and 3 instead of Clauses 1 and 4.


# 45. We observe that Clauses 1 and 4 provide that in case a bank outside the consortium finances the purchase of new assets to the corporate debtor and creates an exclusive charge over those assets then the first charge of the UCO Bank Consortium would be excluded. We consciously take into consideration that the Respondent did not finance the purchase of the assets to the Corporate Debtor at initial level/ original purchase. It was TCSFL, which had initially financed the purchase of the movable assets on 17.06.2014 and 30.06.2014, which the Corporate Debtor repaid to TCSFL on 24.03.2017 and therefore upon repayment, i.e., after 24.03.2017 – the exclusion in respect of UCO Bank Consortium no longer remained applicable. It implies that the UCO Bank Consortium had the first pari-passu charge over the movable assets.


# 46. On the issue of handing over the movable assets to the Respondent, we note that the Respondent had, on 17.12.2019, vide email, requested the Appellant herein to take possession of fourteen (14) movable assets. Immediately on the next day, 18.12.2019, the Appellant informed the Respondent that the Loan Agreements with the corporate debtor did not contain the chassis number/serial number/machine number. Therefore, the Appellant couldn’t map the assets for which the Respondent purported to have charge. The Respondent could not correlate the loan agreements with the assets for the fourteen (14) assets. Therefore, the Appellant could not verify the charge concerning the movable assets by mapping the assets.


# 47. As regard, the controversy in relation to NoC to be taken by the Respondent i.e., from TCFSL or from UCO Bank Consortium, we have already noted the fact that the Respondent on 30.11.2017, more than 8 months later, on 30.11.2017, refinanced the movable assets aggregating to Rs 38,96,50,000/-. It is the case of the Appellant that at this stage, a NOC needed to be sought from the existing charge holder, i.e., the UCO Bank Consortium, primarily because these assets were not being financed for the first time and because UCO Bank Consortium had the first charge over such movable assets. The first charge got crystallised upon repayment of the loan by the Corporate Debtor to TCSFL. Even otherwise, the first charge by hypothecation in terms of Clauses 2 and 3 existed without any such exclusion in favour of the UCO Bank Consortium. Neither does Clauses 1 to 4 allow for assets over which they already have first charge to be charged to other bankers upon refinancing. Therefore, in no circumstances could any charge have been created in favour of third parties, such as the Respondent herein, without the consent or NOC of the UCO Bank Consortium.


# 48. We have taken note from the pleadings that while conducting due diligence as required under Section 52(3) of the Code and Regulation 21 of the Liquidation Regulations, 2016, the Appellant vide an email dated 18.12.2019 and 31.12.2019 categorically requested the Respondent to prove their charges by furnishing the NoC obtained from the UCO Bank Consortium. The impugned order also records this fact in paragraph 4.3 by stating that it is an admitted fact that no NOC was taken from the UCO Bank Consortium. In the absence of an NOC, the charge purported by the Respondent was not proved in terms of Section 52(3) of the Code read with Regulation 21 of the Liquidation Regulations, 2016.


# 49. The main bone of contention and which is central point of the present appeal is regarding as to who has first/ primary charge over movable assets and who has second/secondary charge over the said movable assets. Thus, we will also need to look into the issue brought before us i.e., whether the Respondent’s registration of a charge under Section 77 of the Companies Act, 2013, or UCO Bank Consortium’s non-registration of the charge with the ROC can become the basis for disregarding UCO Bank Consortium first charge based on 8th Supplemental Deed of Working Capital Consortium Agreement.


# 50. We take into consideration Section 48 of TP Act, which reads as under-

  • Where a person purports to create by transfer at different times rights in or over the same immoveable property, and such rights cannot all exist or be exercised to their full extent together, each later created right shall, in the absence of a special contract or reservation binding the earlier transferees, be subject to the rights previously created.”   (Emphasis supplied)


# 51. Section 48 of TP Act stipulate Doctrine of Priority which is based on the Principles of Natural Justice, asserting that when rights are granted to two individuals at different times, the one who possesses the earlier right will also have the legal advantage. This principle is applicable only in situations where the competing interests of the parties are otherwise equal. This doctrine is derived from the legal maxim qui prior est tempore potior est jure, which translates to “he who is first in time is stronger in law.” Section 48 of the TP Act establishes a fundamental principle that no individual can transfer a title greater than what he possess. This means that if a transferor conveys the same property to multiple transferees, each transferee will hold rights equivalent to those of the previous transferee. The doctrine dictates that once a transfer is initiated, the transferor cannot disregard prior grants or engage with the property without acknowledging existing rights.


# 52. In the case of ICICI Bank v. SIDCO Leather passed in Civil Appeal No. 2332 of 2006, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India held that-

  • While enacting a statute, the Parliament cannot be presumed to have taken away a right in property. Right to property is a constitutional right. Right to recover the money lent by enforcing a mortgage would also be a right to enforce an interest in the property. The provisions of the Transfer of Property Act provide for different types of charges. In terms of Section 48 of the Transfer of Property Act claim of the first charge holder shall prevail over the claim of the second charge holder and in a given case where the debts due to both, the first charge holder and the second charge holder, are to be realized from the property belonging to the mortgagor, the first charge holder will have to be repaid first. There is no dispute as regards the said legal position.” (Emphasis supplied)


# 53. Thus, Section 48 of the TP Act, clearly protect the right of first charge holder. Although, Section 48 strictly speaking is w.r.t. immovable properties, in the present case there is common 8th Supplemental Deed of Working Capital Consortium Agreement, where charges were created both on movable and immovable assets of the Corporate Debtor in favour of the UCO Bank Consortium , therefore, interpretation of Section 48 of the TP Act will help the cause of the Appellant for ensuring the charges in favour of UCO Bank Consortium as first charge holder.


# 54. We note that in paragraph 4.3 of the impugned order, the Adjudicating Authority did not consider the requirement of the NOC from the UCO Bank Consortium solely on the ground that the charge of the Respondent was registered with ROC. On this issue, the Appellant strongly argued that registration of the charge does not improve or play a role when it comes to the question of the priorities of the charge. Registration is only a form of proof under Liquidation Regulation 21. It cannot take away or improve/substantiate a charge created, such as hypothecation or a mortgage, under the TP Act.


# 55. We note that this Appellate Tribunal in its earlier order in Canara Bank v. Mr S Rajendran Liquidator of Cape Engineers passed in Company Appeal (AT) (CH) (Ins) No. 277 of 2023, passed on 07.03.2024, held that :-

  • “53. In addition, the ‘non-registration of the Mortgage’, as per Section 77 of the Companies Act, 2013, is not a sufficient/enough ground to come to an ‘opinion’ that the ‘Appellant’ is not a ‘Secured Creditor’. In reality, the ‘rights’ of a ‘Mortgagee’, under the ‘Transfer of Property Act’, 1882 and the ‘SARFAESI Act’, are not to be diluted, in terms of Regulation 21 of IBBI (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016.”

(Emphasis Supplied)


# 56. This Appellate Tribunal in the matter of Unit Small Finance Bank Ltd. v. Sripatham Venkatasubramaniam Ramkumar passed in Company Appeal (AT) (Ins) No. 601 of 2024, passed on 16.04.2024 held that Section 77 of the Companies Act, 2013 cannot be the basis for treating a creditor as unsecured as long as the security was created in terms of Section 3(31) of the Code.


# 57. This Appellate Tribunal in the matter of J.M. Financial Asset Reconstruction Company Ltd v Finquest Financial Solutions Pvt. Ltd. passed in Company Appeal (AT) (Ins) 593 of 2019 held that after enforcement of right under Section 52 of the Code by one of the secured creditors, no other secured creditor can enforce his right subsequently. Thus, only one secured creditor can enforce his right to realise its debt out of secured assets under Section 52 of the Code. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has in various judgments including in the matter of DBS Bank v. Ruchi Soya [(2024) 3 SCC 752] that Sections 52 and 53 of the Code must be read together, and also Section 53(2) expressly states that contractual arrangement inter-se creditors must be disregarded. Only if the asset is charged exclusively to a particular creditor then Section 52 can be given effect.


# 58. Thus, the arguments of the Respondent w.r.t. his holding first charge on movable assets of Corporate Debtor due to charge registered with RoC are not attractive. For same reason, we do not find the Impugned Order on this issue convincing and therefore we do not support the same.


# 59. In view of above detailed analysis we find merits in the arguments of the Appellant. The appeal succeeds and the Impugned Order is set aside. No costs. I.A. if any are closed.

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